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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4663
The goal of this paper is to understand better, at the 
empirical level, how public spending contributes to 
growth by focusing on both the level and composition of 
public spending, in connection to the dynamics of GDP 
per capita growth. It attempts to answer two specific 
questions: (a) What are the policy conditions under 
which public spending contributes positively to growth? 
and (b) What are the public spending components that 
have a stronger and longer-lasting impact on growth?
   The analysis is applied to a sample of seven fast-
growing developing countries: Korea, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Botswana, and Mauritius, 
which have been among the top performers in the world 
in terms of GDP per capita growth during the period 
(1960-2006). 
   The rationale for this country sample selection is 
twofold. The first hypothesis is that, given their positive 
growth achievements over a relatively long time period, 
perhaps it is more straightforward to establish a link to 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Vice President's Office—is part 
of a broader effort to expand our knowledge on fiscal policy issues and, in particular, to enrich the dialogue with country 
teams on how public spending can affect growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bmorenododson@worldbank.org.  
public spending in those countries. Second, it is expected 
that the findings of the analysis will provide lessons 
regarding the level and composition of public spending 
that can be useful for other countries where growth has 
been less rapid. Assessing what role public spending 
has played in a dynamic growth context may indeed be 
enlightening for other cases as well. 
   The paper is structured as follows. The first section 
is an introduction that provides relevant facts and 
information about the seven countries during the period 
of analysis, based on seven individual country case 
studies. Section II presents the theoretical background 
behind the empirical analysis. Section III focuses on 
the empirical methodology, function specification, and 
variables selected. Section IV is dedicated to the results 
obtained with the cross-country analysis and some 
specific country results, as well as some comparisons with 
previous findings by other authors. Finally, Section V 
draws policy implications and concludes.
 
 
 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC SPENDING ON GROWTH 
 
An Empirical Analysis for Seven Fast Growing Countries 
 
Blanca Moreno-Dodson1 
World Bank 
 
Since 1959, when Richard Musgrave published The Theory of Public Finance, it has been 
customary for economists to classify governmental objectives in the three categories of 
stabilization, allocation, and redistribution proposed by Musgrave.  In 1959 growth was 
not recognized as a governmental objective requiring explicit policy action. The pursuit 
of the other three objectives was assumed to automatically generate a natural long run 
rate of growth. However, in recent decades growth has acquired great prominence in 
many countries.  As a consequence, various policies that do not easily fit into Musgrave's 
classification have been introduced.  It is high time to recognize growth as an explicit, 
fourth objective to be added to Musgrave's trio.  It is an objective that many countries 
now try to promote with good and, at times, bad policies.  
VITO TANZI, 2008 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Much of the variation in growth rates among countries and over time remains still not 
fully understood.  Although recent cross-country studies, based on dynamic panel data 
techniques, have been able to correct some of the methodological problems that plagued 
the earlier literature (such as measurement and specification errors, simultaneity bias, and 
the potential for bidirectional causality), few empirical regularities have emerged.  
 
Consider, in particular, the relationship between public spending and growth.  Since the 
seminal contribution by Barro (1990), there have been a number of analytical studies 
highlighting the various channels through which public expenditure may affect growth, as 
the next section will discuss in more detail.   
 
However, at the empirical level, robust relationships have been difficult to establish.  
Much of the evidence on the effects of government expenditure on growth appears to be 
inconclusive.  Although there are strong analytical reasons to believe that public spending 
is one of the important variables that influence growth, there remains significant 
uncertainty about its actual degree of influence.  
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to Pierre-Richard Agénor, University of Manchester and Centre for Growth and 
Business Cycles Research, Homi Kharas, Brookings Institution, Danny Leipziger, World Bank, and Vito 
Tanzi, former IMF Director, for their helpful guidance and feedback.  Comments by Carlos Braga, Brian 
Pinto, Eduardo Ley, and Vivek Suri, World Bank, are also greatly appreciated.  Last but not least, this 
analysis would not have been possible without the excellent research assistance of Nihal Bayraktar, 
Pennsylvania State University, for the econometric work, and Borja de Escalada, World Bank, for the data 
collection. 
 
Understanding and quantifying those effects remains important from a policy perspective, 
particularly in view of the fact that fiscal adjustments in some countries have led, in 
practice, to large reductions in public spending, in order to achieve certain fiscal targets2 
(see Calderón, Easterly, and Servén, 2004, for the case of Latin America).   In that 
respect, it is not clear whether such reductions have contributed to higher growth by 
promoting macroeconomic stability or, on the contrary, they have hampered it by leading 
to excessive cuts in some productive components of public spending.  It is also plausible 
that both effects could have occurred simultaneously.   
 
The goal of this paper is to understand better, at the empirical level, how public spending 
contributes to growth by focusing on both the level and composition of public spending, 
in connection to the dynamics of GDP per capita growth.  It attempts to answer two 
specific questions: (a) What are the policy conditions under which public spending 
contributes positively to growth?, and (b) What are the public spending components that 
have a stronger and longer-lasting impact on growth? 
 
The analysis is applied to a sample of seven fast-growing developing countries: Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Botswana, and Mauritius, which have been 
among the top performers in the world in terms of GDP per capita growth during the 
period (1960-2006) 3.  
 
The rationale for this country sample selection is twofold.  The first hypothesis is that, 
given their positive growth achievements over a relatively long time period, perhaps it is 
more straightforward to establish a link to public spending in those countries.  Second, it 
is expected that the findings of the analysis will provide lessons regarding the level and 
composition of public spending that can be useful for other countries where growth has 
been less rapid.  Assessing what role public spending has played in a dynamic growth 
context may indeed be enlightening for other cases as well.  
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The first section is an introduction that provides 
relevant facts and information about the seven countries during the period of analysis, 
based on seven individual country case studies4.  Section II presents the theoretical 
background behind the empirical analysis.  Section III focuses on the empirical 
methodology, function specification, and variables selected.  Section IV is dedicated to 
the results obtained with the cross-country analysis and some specific country results, as 
well as some comparisons with previous findings by other authors.  Finally, Section V 
draws policy implications and concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 Although fiscal adjustment could have taken place by creating fiscal space through the revenue side of the 
government equation, for example by raising additional tax revenues, the fact of the matter is that in some 
countries particular spending categories have been actually reduced to meet the fiscal balance target.  
3 All the countries selected in the sample have sustained GDP per capita growth rates of at least 3% (by 
decade average) during 1960-2006.  
4 For the country case analysis and the comparative study conclusions see “How Public Spending Can Help 
you Grow.  Lessons from Seven Fast Growing Countries”, Moreno-Dodson, forthcoming 2008.  
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I. COUNTRY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this section is to present some country facts and findings5 that are 
relevant for the interpretation of the subsequent empirical re 6sults .   
                                                
First, a simple growth accounting exercise7 focused on how capital, labor, and total factor 
productivity (TFP) have contributed to growth reveals that in the seven countries 
production factors, in particular capital and labor, have been the main growth drivers.  
However, as all of them have witnessed their economic transformation towards higher 
value added activities in the secondary and tertiary sectors, relying more on innovation, 
the contribution of TFP growth has been gradually increasing through the years8, to reach 
the highest levels in Korea and Singapore where it is around 25%9.  These results are 
relevant for our analysis since, as discussed on page 6, according to growth theory, public 
spending could influence growth not only through labor and capital, but also through 
TFP. 
In terms of government effectiveness10, all countries in the sample, with the exception of 
Indonesia, rank quite favorably when compared with the rest of the world.  Many 
differences persist, however, notably in the functions attributed to the government, which 
reflect diverse economic strategies and degrees of intervention, as well as their 
approaches to successfully promote transparency and fight corruption.  While Singapore 
is considered among the most effective governments in the world, with a 99.5 ranking 
position11 and a leader fighting corruption which awards it a 98.1 ranking in 2006, 
Indonesia has the lowest ranking in our sample on both government effectiveness, at 
43.4, and corruption control at 23.3 in 2006.  All other countries are somehow in 
between, with Korea being the second most effective government in our sample at 82.9 
and Thailand being at 64.9 in the ranking.   
Regarding the size of the government budget, with the exception of Botswana, all 
countries in our sample have managed to keep a relatively small size of total public 
spending, which is below 30% of GDP12.  Botswana’s ratios are not only the highest in 
the sample but also show an upward trend from 25.53% of GDP in the 1970s to 38.83% 
 
5 See comparative tables at the end of the paper. 
6 See individual country case studies for details. 
7 The analysis is based on existing growth accounting data for all seven countries.  
8 The only country where TFP growth does not appear to have increased through the years, but rather 
shows a downward trend, is Botswana.  Coincidentally, Botswana is the country where fewer synergies 
have been found with the private sector and the dependence on government spending is the strongest.  
9 This is still lower than the average for OECD countries. 
10 According to the KKM indicators, government effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service, the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
11 Kray, Kauffman and Mastruzzi (KKM) indicators using a (0-100) percentile rank, World Bank.  No data 
exist before 1996.  
12 The definition used here refers to the consolidated central government only, which includes the central 
government plus all government entities associated to it, and excludes all public spending at sub-national 
level, GFS IMF statistics. It was not feasible to construct a reliable database for the consolidated general 
government including all countries in the sample.  
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of GDP during 2000-2005, reflecting an increasingly predominant role of the public 
sector through the decades.  However, since Botswana is ranked very highly, at 73.9 in 
2006, on government effectiveness and 78.2 on control of corruption, it can be inferred 
that, despite the predominant role of the government in the economy, transparency and 
good governance have not been undermined.   
 
On the opposite side of the spectrum we find Singapore which has managed to maintain a 
small share of public spending to GDP during the four decades of analysis, reaching an 
average ratio of 16.58% in 2000-2005, one of the lowest and most stable ratios in the 
world, despite continuous increases in GDP per capita.   
 
With respect to government spending composition, according to the traditional functional 
classification of expenditures, it is interesting to notice that while economic spending13, 
including infrastructure, agriculture, energy, etc., predominated in the first decades, the 
percentage of the total budget allocated to social expenditures14 has been rising over time 
in all seven countries, with no exceptions, to represent the highest share of the total 
budget by 2000.  Such increases are particularly significant in Botswana, Indonesia, 
Korea, Singapore, and Thailand.   
 
In the cases of Botswana and Indonesia, a priority switch towards social spending has 
been achieved through a decrease in economic and other categories of expenditures 
which were higher at earlier stages of development, particularly during the 1970s when 
building physical capital through basic infrastructure was required to jump start the 
growth process.  In the other five countries we observe parallel decreases in defense and 
general services spending, while economic spending continues being important, although 
not predominant. 
 
When using the definition of Bleany at al.15, which distinguishes a priori between 
productive and unproductive expenditures, all countries in our sample show a clear 
predominance of productive spending, which is sustained through the decades of 
analysis, with some fluctuations by country as expected. 
 
Regarding fiscal stability, none of the above countries is characterized by relatively large 
fiscal deficits16, at least when using the conventional approach to measuring it17.  Despite 
their spending increases at times of low private investment flows, some interventionist 
approaches to industrial policy, financial crises, ad hoc countercyclical spending, and 
                                                 
13 Economic public spending includes: fuel and energy; agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining, 
mineral resources, manufacturing, and construction; transportation and communication; and other 
economic affairs and services.  For the central government.  IMF GFS. 
14 Social public spending includes: education; health; social security and welfare; housing and community 
amenities; and recreational, cultural, and religious affairs.  For the central government. IMF GFS 
15 According to this definition, productive spending includes: general public services; defense; education; 
health; housing; and transportation and communication.  See Section III. 
16 Malaysia shows the highest fiscal deficits at 5.40% of GDP in 2000-2005 
17 This definition of fiscal deficit refers only to the difference between total revenues (including grants) and 
expenditures net of lending for the consolidated central government.  It does not include flows at sub-
national levels and contingent liabilities that have not been reflected in the government budget.   
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other circumstances, it can be said that they all have managed to maintain certain fiscal 
discipline over time. 
 
In terms of equality, high GDP per capita growth rates sustained through almost half a 
century have certainly led to a decline in absolute income poverty in all seven countries.  
However, on improving income and non-income distribution, the evidence found points 
to rather mixed results18. 
 
In this respect, a gradual increased emphasis on public spending on social sectors in all 
seven countries seems to have been motivated in most of them precisely by the need to 
further reduce inequality and facilitate the social insertion of those less qualified or 
equipped to work in higher value added sectors, due to a perceived risk that persistent 
inequalities could jeopardize growth in the medium-term.  At the same time, previous 
achievements in basic infrastructure and a stronger role of the private sector, reflected in 
higher private investments and FDI, perhaps with the exception of Botswana where 
public spending still plays a predominant role, have allowed for the transition towards a 
public sector more heavily focused on reducing income and non-income disparities.  
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the growth literature, several analytical and empirical studies have focused on the 
traditional and new channels through which different types of public spending can affect 
growth19.     
 
A direct effect relates to an increase in the economy’s capital stock (physical or human) 
reflecting higher flows of public funds, especially when they are complementary to those 
privately financed.  For example, public spending in education and health contribute to an 
increase in the stock of human capital.  Similarly, to the extent that they trigger an 
accumulation of physical capital, most public expenditures in infrastructure fall in this 
category as having a direct impact on growth.   
 
In addition, public funds can also contribute to growth indirectly by increasing the 
marginal productivity of both publicly and privately supplied production factors.    For 
example, public expenditures on research and development (R&D) promote higher 
productivity in the interaction between physical and human capital factors, in a similar 
way as adopting private sector financed foreign technologies.   
 
Similarly, other components of public spending, related for instance to the enforcement 
of property rights and maintenance of public order, can also exert a positive indirect 
effect on growth by contributing to better use of existing capital and labor assets. For 
instance, in countries where crime and violence are endemic, increased public spending 
                                                 
18 This issue is, however, not addressed in the empirical analysis of this paper. 
19 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Zagler and Durnecker (2003), and Agénor (2004) for overviews of 
this literature, and Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2007) for a particular focus on public spending on 
infrastructure.  Noteworthy empirical studies include Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou, 1996; Tanzi and Zee, 
1997; Bleaney, Gemmel, and Kneller, 2001; and Bose, Haque, and Osborn, 2007, to which we shall return. 
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on security can lead to lower production costs by reducing the need to protect employees 
and physical assets, increasing worker productivity, and stimulating private physical 
investment (through an increased in expected rates of return on capital).  
 
There is also growing evidence suggesting that in developing countries externalities 
associated with infrastructure spending may be more important that commonly thought.  
Indeed, it has been found that infrastructure may have a sizable impact on human capital 
as well.  As discussed by Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2007), public spending in 
infrastructure affects growth not only through its direct impact on investment and the 
productivity of factors in the private sector, but also through health and education 
outcomes. 
 
For instance, access to clean water and sanitation helps to improve health and thereby 
productivity.  By reducing the cost of boiling water and reducing the need to rely on 
smoky traditional fuels for cooking, access to electricity also helps to improve hygiene 
and health.  Availability of electricity is essential for the functioning of hospitals and the 
delivery of health services.  Better transportation networks also contribute to easier 
access to health care, particularly in rural areas.   
 
There is also evidence of direct linkages between infrastructure and education. Electricity 
allows for more studying and greater access to learning technologies.  Enrollment rates 
and the quality of education tend to improve with better transportation networks, 
particularly in rural areas. Greater access to sanitation and clean water in schools also 
tend to raise attendance rates20. 
 
The growth accounting framework evolving from the neoclassical Solow-Swan model 
(1956) consists of adding the basic contributions of capital and labor to growth, and an 
unexplained residual capturing improvements in technology (also known as the Solow 
residual or the rate of growth of total factor productivity, TFP)21.   
 
Within this framework, public spending could, in principle, impact growth by affecting 
capital and/or labor, as well as the generation and/or assimilation of technological 
progress reflected in TFP.  However, since it is assumed in the model that the long-run 
growth rate is driven only by the population growth and the rate of technical progress, 
which is considered to be exogenous, the effect of public spending on growth through the 
production factors is considered to be only transitional. 
 
On the contrary, endogenous growth models, such a those of Barro (1990); King and 
Rebelo (1990); and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), predict that “productive” 
public spending will indeed affect the long-run growth rate and not only its transitional 
                                                 
20The implications of this literature for the optimal allocation of public expenditure in a growth context is 
discussed by Agénor (2008), Agénor and Neanidis (2006), and Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2007). 
21 The experience of industrial countries seems to suggest that the accumulation of physical capital is a very 
important source of growth in the early stages of development and that technological progress becomes the 
principal driving force once a relatively high level of capital intensity (measured by the capital to labor 
ratio) has been reached, see Agénor, 2004. 
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changes.  In such scenario, it is possible to envisage that public spending may change the 
growth path, by affecting the production factors and/or TFP.   
 
Empirically, the relationship between public spending and growth in support of either 
neoclassical or endogenous models has been difficult to establish for several reasons.  A 
large part of the recent empirical literature on growth has examined the impact on growth 
of both the level and composition of government expenditures.  Overall the evidence on 
the nature of this relationship is mixed.  First of all, not all the public funds that appear in 
government budgets as having been spent were actually used according to budget 
allocations; any leakages or deviations from the original budget plan diminish the impact 
of public spending and distort its relationship with growth22.   
 
Second, efficiency constraints affect the share of the public spending flows actually used 
in creating new capital (physical and human) stocks, which affect growth directly23.  
Thus, by considering the total amounts of public spending financed, without any 
efficiency considerations, we may anticipate a higher impact on growth than what can be 
realistically expected. 
 
Third, while some public spending may be, by itself, growth-promoting, the way through 
which the government chooses to finance it (inflationary financing, distortionary taxes, 
public debt leading to high interest rates resulting in crowding out of private investment, 
etc.) may have the opposite influence on growth.  Since the two effects are difficult to 
disentangle, the impact of public spending on growth depends on its source of 
financing24.  Yet, many empirical studies fail to include the implicit financial 
assumptions, or revenue side of the equation, when testing for the impact of public 
spending on growth.   
 
Fourth, since not all categories of public spending are expected to have the same growth 
impact, classifying them according to different criteria may be essential to differentiate 
those items that are truly “productive” from those whose growth impact is negligible.  
However, data availability does not always allow for such classification25.  
 
                                                 
22 Quantitative techniques such as Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) that are being currently 
conducted in many developing countries show that the percentage of spending actually reaching the 
population is much lower than what was recorded in the budget as being spent, due to leakages and 
inadequate budget implementation. 
23 This issue was raised by Pritchet in 1996 who reckoned that only about 50% of public investments flows 
in developing countries contribute to creating new capital stock (see Pritchet, 2000).  The idea has been 
further developed and tested by Hurlin and Arestoff, 2006.  
24 In Barro’s (1990) model, growth increases with expenditures and taxation at low levels, and then 
decreases as the distortionary effects of taxation exceed the beneficial effects of public spending.  In 
addition, at higher levels of public spending inefficiency may increase.  That is the main conclusion of 
Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi in reference to new EU members (forthcoming 2008). 
25 While aggregated expenditures are easier to find on an annual basis for a relatively long period of time, 
not all the sectors report data every year and therefore functional classifications are not always possible.  In 
addition, some countries have introduced recent changes in the budget nomenclature, which make sectoral 
comparisons less meaningful. 
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Finally, initial country conditions, reflecting the level of country development and living 
standards (such as life expectancy and/or human capital indexes), influence the effects of 
different public spending categories on growth26.  Therefore, omitting initial conditioning 
variables in the analysis could distort the final results27.   
 
Other issues arise from methodological problems28 associated with separating short-run 
and long-run effects of public spending on growth, as well as testing for the 
endogeneity29 of public spending with respect to growth, and the existence of 
nonlinearities30. 
 
The objective of this paper is to conduct a quantitative assessment of the impact of public 
spending on growth using an endogenous growth framework.  The main issue is to test 
whether the historical evidence reflected in GDP per capita growth rates of around 3% or 
more for almost half a century (1960-2006) in the selected country sample supports the 
theoretical background underlying endogenous growth models with respect to the role of 
public spending.  Knowing more about how the effects of public spending on growth 
have crystallized and evolved over time in those fast growing countries could be helpful 
for other parts of the world. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
Function Specification and Variable Definitions 
 
The quantitative analysis is conducted using panel data for the selected seven countries31 
during the period 1970-200632, focusing mainly on the effect of public spending on 
growth (See Appendix I for data information)33. 
 
Different function specification forms were first considered, following Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, Bleaney et al., 2001; and Bose et al. 2007.  The model chosen for the study is 
similar to the ones presented in previous papers but introduces some specific 
characteristics and innovations to fit the country sample and the objectives of the broader 
analysis.   
 
Initially, the direct sensitivity of GDP per capita growth to public spending is tested using 
a function specification in which the rate of growth of GDP per capita is the dependent 
                                                 
26 Intuitively, building basic physical and social infrastructure should trigger a much more significant 
growth effect in low income settings than in countries where a certain threshold has already been reached.     
27 Levine and Renelt, 1992. 
28 Bleany, Gemmel, and Kneller, 2001. 
29 Public spending may affect growth positively but faster growth may also induce larger government 
spending. 
30 See Barro, 1990. 
31 These seven fast-growing countries were considered as “developing” countries at the beginning of the 
period of analysis. 
32 Although the qualitative analysis starts in 1960, compatible data are not available before 1970 and 
therefore the econometric work focuses on the period 1970-2006. 
33 Annual data are used in some of the regressions.  Three-year averages are also calculated and used for 
some others. 
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variable and the ratios of fiscal variables to GDP are the key explanatory variables, 
controlling for other non-fiscal, growth-promoting determinants. 
 
The basic model is as follows: 
 
CPIINFbFSbPEbFRbHCbpbyby itititiititit 76543211 ˆˆ ++++++= −  
 
where: 
 
i is the country index 
 
t is the year index 
 
yˆ  is the rate of growth of GDP per capita 
 
p is the ratio of private investment to GDP34 
 
HC is the initial human capital 
 
FR is the ratio of total Fiscal Revenues to GDP35 
 
PE is the ratio of total Public Expenditures to GDP36  
 
FS is the ratio of the Fiscal Balance (Surplus) to GDP, 
 
CPIINF is the inflation rate, 
 
and b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, and b7 are the coefficients assigned to the independent variables.  
 
Three groups of independent variables are considered: control variables (other, non-
fiscal, determinants of growth), initial conditioning variables, and fiscal variables.   
 
The selection of control variables was made taking into account lessons from both the 
growth literature and the individual country case studies.  In particular, the ratio of 
private sector investment to GDP is retained on the grounds that, during the period of 
analysis, in all countries (except for Botswana) the largest share of total investment was 
                                                 
34 In some regressions, openness has been used, instead of the private investment-to-GDP ratio, as a control 
variable. 
35 In some function specifications total fiscal revenues are disaggregated into tax and non-tax revenues. 
36 In a different function specification, total public spending is disaggregated according to functional 
categories into social and economic spending (criterion 1); see Page 7 and Annex I.  Then, the distinction 
has been made between productive and unproductive public expenditures, using an a priori definition 
(criterion 2).  Finally, a last specification has consisted of focusing only on expenditures in education, 
health, and transportation, which are expected to be critical for development (criterion 3).  In all cases we 
are referring to the central government only. 
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financed by the private sector, and some complementarity effects between private and 
public investment were detected.   
 
Since one of the goals of the analysis is to understand better under which policy 
circumstances public spending affects growth, the inflation rate is introduced as a 
measure of the degree of macroeconomic instability, attempting to capture both monetary 
and fiscal policymaking37.   
 
In addition, an openness variable (OPEN, measured in standard fashion as the sum of 
exports plus imports divided by GDP) is also introduced based on the fact that in most of 
the selected countries growth has occurred in connection with export-led development 
strategies38. 
 
Finally, the lagged value of the dependent variable (GDP per capita growth rate in period 
t-1) is included to take into account growth inertia factors39.  This provides a natural way 
to distinguish between short- and medium-run effects on growth. 
 
As in other similar studies, the initial conditioning variables that were initially selected 
were the initial life expectancy, the initial level of human capital, and/or the initial GDP 
per capita.  For instance, Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2004) found that life expectancy 
has a sizable, positive effect on economic growth; a one-year improvement in the 
population's life expectancy contributes to an increase in the long-run growth rate of up 
to 4 percentage points. Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) also found that 
initial life expectancy has a positive effect on growth.  Regarding the other two variables, 
Sala-i-Martin et al. found that the initial level of human capital (as proxied by primary 
schooling enrollment rates) and initial GDP per capita were also significant.  As human 
capital was more significant than the other two initial conditioning variables in all 
regressions, in the end it is the only one retained. 
 
Regarding the fiscal variables, the government budget constraint is considered in the 
specification function, for methodological reasons, by introducing total fiscal revenues 
(tax and non-tax) plus the fiscal balance variable40 (defined as total fiscal revenue, tax 
and non-tax, plus grants, minus total public spending net of lending), both variables as 
ratios to GDP, for the central government.  
 
                                                 
37 In another function specification, the ratio of external debt to GDP was introduced as a debt sustainability 
variable.  However, due to lack of sufficient data for all countries, such specification was not retained for 
the analysis.  Results are available upon request. 
38 The basic model in page 9 does not show the openness variable, OPEN, since it has been considered only 
in some forms of the regression. 
39 See also endogeneity effects in page 13. 
40 It is important to notice that lagged values of public expenditure ratios are used (t-1) while the fiscal 
deficit is taken at its current value (t).  The rationale is that while it takes some time for (executed) public 
spending to influence growth, the impact of fiscal stability can be observed within the same year since it 
affects investors’ confidence and inflation expectations.  In addition there could be a timing measurement 
issue since, in some countries, public spending spread over two calendar years (fiscal year ends in June), 
whereas the fiscal deficit is measured for statistical purposes at the end of the calendar year.  
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In addition, given the importance of good governance on the growth impact of total 
public spending, an index of governance is introduced.  In order to assess these effects, a 
governance interactive variable is constructed by multiplying the selected country 
governance indicator by the ratio of public spending to GDP41.  Finally, another 
innovation of this paper consists of adding a coefficient of technical efficiency42 of 
spending, based on the notion that not all public expenditures that are executed contribute 
to increase the stock of human/physical capital and therefore the analysis of their 
potential impact on growth needs to take efficiency considerations into account43.  For 
this purpose, an ICOR is calculated for total public investment and then multiplied by the 
different ratios of total public spending to GDP44   
 
Expenditure Classifications 
 
Unlike other studies testing only the impact of public investment on growth while 
ignoring completely current spending, this analysis includes total public spending, capital 
and current, without specifically separating them.  The rationale for this decision is based 
on the evidence that some categories of current spending items are indeed critical to 
ensure the profitability of investments.   
 
For example, operations and maintenance expenditures, which are considered as current 
spending items, are critical to ensure the profitability of infrastructure investments since 
they can facilitate access and prevent accidents, permitting citizens to arrive safely to 
markets, schools, hospitals or any other destinations.  Similarly, salaries of teachers, 
usually classified under the current spending rubric, are closely connected to the quality 
of education provided.   In addition, it would not be realistic to try and isolate public 
investments completely since in many countries capital budgets include de facto, 
explicitly or implicitly, salaries and current spending items.   
 
In order to examine trade-offs across expenditure functions and categories, public 
expenditures are grouped according to three main different criteria.  Criterion (1) 
corresponds to the GFS classification for functional expenditures which distinguishes 
among economic45 and social46 expenditures; the rest of the budget includes defense, 
general public services, and others. 
  
                                                 
41 Since the World Bank Kauffman-Kray-Mastruzzi indicators are not available before 1996, an index of 
government effectiveness, which is measured by the level of bureaucratic quality from the Political Risk 
Indicators database (PRS), is used since 1986.  No other governance indicators are available before that 
date. 
42 This concept of efficiency is defined as an input-output concept which focuses strictly on the contribution 
of public spending flows to creating stocks of human/physical capital. 
43 See Agénor, Nabli, and Yousef, 2007 for a more detailed description of this methodology. 
44 The governance and efficiency variables are not included in the basic model of page 9. 
45 Economic public spending includes: fuel and energy; agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining, 
mineral resources, manufacturing, and construction; transportation and communication; and other 
economic affairs and services.  For the central government. 
46 Social public spending includes: education; health; social security and welfare; housing and community 
amenities; and recreational, cultural, and religious affairs.  For the central government. 
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Criterion (2) presents a classification47 of expenditures split in two categories, 
“productive”48 and “unproductive”49, based on an a priori judgment regarding their 
expected impact on growth.   
 
Criterion (3) presents a sectoral classification which is only used in some regressions, 
specifically for education, health, and transport and communications public expenditures, 
only to analyze individual country effects.   
 
With Criterion (1), the rationale behind using broad categories of expenditures, rather 
than sectoral ones (such as education, health…) is twofold.  First, when observing the 
patterns of evolution of public spending in all seven countries, two clearly differentiated 
paths are observed for economic and social spending categories, respectively50.  In other 
words, governments tend to increase either economic or social expenditures as shares of 
total spending depending on the effects that they want to trigger51.  Second, from an 
econometric viewpoint, using broad aggregates avoids potential colinearity problems that 
may result from using individually the sectoral items included within each functional 
category.   
 
As mentioned before, Criterion (2) implies an a priori judgment about the expected 
impact of different public spending categories on growth, which is later tested.  An 
implicit assumption behind this classification is that, regardless of their evolution as 
shares of total spending, public expenditures in economic, social sectors, and others, may 
have a greater impact on growth when estimated jointly.  Using a normative notion of 
“integrated” development, governments should not plan expenditures by categories but 
rather taking into account synergies across sectors52 to have higher impact on growth.  
Under such scenario, it would be more reasonable to group public expenditures under 
broader labels according to their expected impact on growth without distinguishing 
whether they are economic, social, or other types of expenditures.  As in the case of 
Criterion (1), this approach also attempts to avoid colinearity among individual spending 
categories53.   
 
Finally, when using Criterion (3), the goal is to estimate the effect of public expenditures 
in three critical sectors (education, health, and transport and communications) on GDP 
                                                 
47 This categorization was introduced by Bleany, Gammel, and Kneller in 2001, and it is consistent with the 
theory behind endogenous growth models according to which only “productive” spending should be 
expected to have an impact on growth; see the discussion above. 
48 Productive spending includes: general public services; defense; education; health; housing; and 
transportation and communication. 
49 Unproductive spending includes: social security and welfare, recreation, and other economic services.  
50 Other expenditures, such as defense and general public services, do not follow such clear patterns. 
51 For example Thailand, Korea, and Singapore increased economic spending all together in periods when 
they wanted to stimulate growth while they raised social spending when equity and inclusiveness concerns 
were more acute. 
52 For example, taking into account access to hospitals and schools when designing the road network 
investment plans. 
53 Anyway, in both cases, Criteria (1) and Criteria (2), some public spending categories are left out of the 
regression to avoid collinearity problems. 
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per capita growth at the country level and compare the results with previous econometric 
work based on a similar sectoral classification. 
 
Econometric Methods 
 
Three econometric methods are used (OLS, SURE, and GMM) and their results are then 
compared54.  For the selected country sample, the short and medium-term growth impacts 
of public spending on GDP per capita growth (dependant variable) are analyzed.  First, 
using annual data, the focus is on the short-term effect.  Second, the same regressions are 
run using three-year average data to “smooth out” cyclical effects55 and the results of 
both exercises are compared using OLS and SURE methods.  Finally, a dynamic panel 
technique (GMM) is used and the results are compared with those obtained with the static 
panel regressions (OLS and SURE). 
 
The SURE methodology is a type of ordinary least squares (OLS) specification which 
can be used to account for various patterns of correlation among the residuals.  There are 
four basic variance structures: period specific heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous 
covariances, between period covariances, and cross-section specific heteroskedasticity 
(SURE), which is the one used in this paper.  This methodology is used to check whether 
or not our results with ordinary least square change when we introduced cross-section 
specific heteroskedasticity, given that in the data set we include countries that are quite 
different from each other. 
 
Regarding the endogeneity of public spending with respect to growth, first of all we 
observe that in none of the sample countries (except for Botswana) the size of total 
government spending as ratio of GDP grew more than the rate of GDP growth during the 
period of analysis, which may indicate that public spending has contributed to growth 
more than growth has contributed to increased public spending.   
 
Nevertheless, in the econometric analysis the possible endogeneity of public spending 
with respect to growth is taken into account when using the three econometric methods.  
Initially56, the lagged values (year t-1) of GDP per capita growth and public spending to 
GDP ratios are introduced as regressors, in order to isolate the effects of public spending 
on GDP per capita growth.   
 
Since, as recognized in the literature, this is an imperfect technique, our third econometric 
method, the GMM dynamic panel method, is used to allow for a more rigorous treatment 
of the endogeneity of public spending with respect to growth and leads to consistent 
estimates.  GMM is, with no doubt, the best methodology to estimate the empirical 
                                                 
54 See Appendix II for a detailed description of the three methods. 
55 Given the lack of degrees of freedom, it was not feasible to use five-year averages, as is commonly done 
in cross-country growth regressions.  It should be noted, however, that the use of five-year averages has 
been criticized as being somewhat arbitrary; there is no strong reason to believe, a priori, that applying a 
common moving average filter is the correct procedure for extracting the cyclical component of all 
variables. There is also a potential loss of information that is hard to quantify. 
56 When using OLS and SURE techniques. 
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specification.  However, in the presence of lagged instrumental variables, data 
availability restricts our ability to use this methodology consistently.  Therefore we 
continue relying on OLS and confirm that the results obtained are consistent with the 
SURE methodology, and, when possible, with GMM.  As indicated in the next section, 
OLS and SURE methodologies produced similar results57, and GMM confirmed most of 
them. 
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
The overall results show that, in the selected countries, total public spending58 has an 
economically and statistically significant positive effect on the GDP per capita growth 
rate, after having taken into account the effects of total fiscal revenues and the fiscal 
balance, and after controlling for other variables, in particular the inflation rate and the 
ratio of private sector investment to GDP or the degree of openness, OPEN.  In all 
regression using this specification, the statistical significance of the results increases 
when the lagged value of GDP per capita growth is added, which may indicate that public 
spending is exerting a positive influence on growth and not vice versa. 
 
Tables 1 (OLS and SURE) and 2 (GMM) present the results obtained with the three 
econometric methods used, regressing GDP per capita growth with respect to the ratio of 
total public spending to GDP, using annual data and the basic model described before.  
 
Both the OLS and SURE methodologies indicate that total public spending and the 
fiscal surplus have a significant impact on GDP per capita growth at 1 percent.  The 
negative effects of inflation (macroeconomic instability) and total fiscal revenues are 
significant also at 1 percent.  The lagged valued of the dependant variable has a positive 
sign and a highly significant coefficient, indicating strong growth dynamics from year to 
year. 
 
The GMM results are consistent with the previous two methods but some of the variables 
lose significance, particularly the budget surplus and total fiscal revenues.  Total public 
spending remains significant at 5 percent and the negative effect of inflation 
dominates, indicating that perhaps in a dynamic setting macroeconomic stability 
becomes the most important condition for GDP per capita growth59. 
 
                                                 
57 A Granger causality test was also conducted between productive public expenditures and growth. The 
results (available upon request) indicate that there is no such causality relation, which probably indicates 
that other variables are affecting both.  However, the test indicates that growth leads to higher amount of 
productive expenditures in Botswana, Mauritania, and Thailand.  On the other hand, productive 
expenditures lead to growth only in Botswana. 
58 We aggregate productive and unproductive public spending, which in most countries add up to about 
80% of total public spending.  The only category left is “others” which includes only unclassified spending.  
59 Initial conditions and non-fiscal control variables are not included in this regression since in a dynamic 
cross-country setting they may have non-linear effects on growth.   
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Criterion (1) 
 
When separating economic and social spending as ratios of GDP, according to Criterion 
1, only economic spending appears to be positive for growth.  The results are presented in 
Tables 3 and 460.   
 
Table 3 (OLS with annual data) shows that the coefficients for both economic and social 
expenditures are positive but only the one of economic public spending is statistically 
significant at 10 percent, indicating a positive effect on growth of economic public 
spending in the short term.  
 
The results also indicate that there is a strong positive effect of macroeconomic stability 
on growth as the coefficient obtained for inflation is negative and statistically very 
significant at a 1 percent level.   
 
Table 4 (OLS and SURE with 3-year average) presents similar results in terms of 
coefficients with economic public expenditures being statistically significant at 5 percent 
and 1 percent, respectively.  This may indicate that economic public expenditures not 
only have a transitional effect on growth but also affect its path over the medium- 
term61.   
 
Regarding the positive effect of macroeconomic stability on growth, the coefficients 
obtained using three-years averages corroborate those reported in Table 3.  The negative 
sign for inflation is statistically significant at a 5 and 1 percent level respectively, 
indicating the vital importance of maintaining macroeconomic stability to sustain 
growth over the medium-term.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the negative effect of total fiscal revenues on 
growth that was detected in earlier regressions becomes particularly significant for non-
tax revenues when using this specification.  It is possible to interpret this result on the 
basis of country evidence indicating that non-tax fees levied by the government in both 
economic and social sectors may have been more detrimental to growth that tax 
compliance obligations62. 
 
Criterion (2) 
 
When disaggregating total public spending to distinguish between a priori productive and 
unproductive spending (Criterion 2), the results indicate that, in fact, it is productive 
                                                 
60 Due to the small sample and data limitations, it is not possible to obtain coherent findings using the 
GMM method with this criterion.  Better results are later found using Criteria 2. 
61 These results should, however, be interpreted with some caution, given that the sample size drops 
significantly as a result of data averaging. 
62 For example, this may be particularly relevant in Singapore where a formal welfare system has never 
been established and the government has used a compulsory savings scheme to allocate funds to some 
workers’ compensation benefits. 
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expenditures that have the most statistically significant positive effect on growth.  The 
results using this criterion are shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7.   
 
Table 5 (OLS with annual data) reinforce the results found with Criterion (1) regarding 
the budget surplus and macroeconomic stability (inflation), and also shows positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for both categories of expenditures, productive and 
unproductive (lower values), with the highest significance level of 1 percent for 
productive expenditure and 10 percent for unproductive expenditure.   
   
Table 6 (OLS and SURE with 3-year averages) shows, however, that unproductive 
expenditures do not have any impact on growth anymore, which could indicate that the 
effects observed in Table 5 are just transitional and do not affect the medium-term path of 
growth. But productive expenditures are still statistically significant at the highest 1 
percent level. 
 
Table 7 (GMM) confirms that in a dynamic panel, only productive expenditures have 
a positive effect on growth that is statistically relevant at 1 percent level.  Unproductive 
expenditures also have a positive coefficient, but the results are not statistically 
significant. 
 
The results obtained using this criterion, using the OLS methodology and three-year 
average data, are also presented in Table 8 in comparison with the results found by the 
same authors who defined the productive-unproductive a priori expenditure classification 
(Bleaney, Kneller, and Glemmell in 2001)63 using also OLS but with five-year average 
data.  We find some similar findings, notably the statistical relevance of the productive 
expenditures ratio with a positive coefficient64.     
 
Finally, the results reported above seem to present a strong linear relationship between 
economic growth and productive expenditures.  Given this information, we could still ask 
whether or not this relationship has any nonlinear components.  To answer this question, 
we add a square term of productive expenditures in our regression specification65.  While 
the coefficient of the linear term captures the direction of the link between economic 
growth and productive expenditures, the square term explains whether the link is concave 
or convex.   
 
The results are presented in Table 9.  When we add the nonlinear term in our regression 
equation, the linear term of productive expenditures still has a positive coefficient and it 
is statistically significant at 10 percent (down from 1 percent without the nonlinear term).  
                                                 
63 Their data set covers twenty-two “developed” countries during 1970-1995.  
64 Unlike the work done by Bleaney et al., in this paper fiscal revenues are introduced as the sum of tax plus 
non-tax revenues in the function specification.  No differentiation is made between distortionary and non-
distortionary taxation. The main reason is that the focus of this paper is strictly the impact of public 
spending on growth, and not on how the structure of the tax system affects growth. 
65 If the coefficient of the square term is positive, it indicates a convex relationship between two variables.  
It means an increasing slope of the function.  The negative coefficient of the square term indicates a 
concave relationship between variables, meaning a decreasing slope of the function.   
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On the other hand, the coefficient of the square term of productive expenditures is 
negative showing a concave relationship between growth and productive expenditures, 
but this coefficient is not statistically significant.  Thus, we can conclude that 
nonlinearities—at least as measured by adding a quadratic term to the base 
regression—are not statistically important for our regression specification. 
 
Other Results 
 
Although the main focus of the analysis is on public spending, based on the regressions 
presented before, it is also relevant to extract some conclusions regarding the other 
independent variables: 
 
• The initial conditioning variables do not seem to have been binding determinants 
of the growth dynamics process.  The level of initial human capital appears, 
however, as a positive conditioning factor, with the right sign but not always 
statistically significant66. 
 
• The private sector investment ratio to GDP, when used as control variable, has in 
most cases a positive sign and is statistically significant; this confirms the fact that 
private capital accumulation has been one of the main engines of growth in the 
selected countries67. 
 
• The openness variable also exhibits a positive sign, indicating its influence on 
growth.  However, it is interesting to notice that such effect becomes most visible 
when the dynamic panel GMM technique is used, which implies that there are 
other indirect effects among the independent variables that are better captured 
through this, more sophisticated, method. 
 
• The total fiscal revenue to GDP ratio exhibits a negative sign and is, for most 
regressions, statistically significant; the fiscal surplus to GDP ratio is always 
positive and statistically significant.  These results are theoretically correct and 
attest to the fact that there is a downside to financing public spending.  In 
addition, the positive effect of the fiscal surplus may reflect its contribution to 
lowering interest rates thus promoting more private investment which is proven to 
be conducive to growth.  
 
• When total fiscal revenues are disaggregated into tax and non-tax revenues, non-
tax revenues appear to be more statistically significant than tax revenues.  This 
result could indicate that, while the tax burden has remained relatively light in 
                                                 
66 This result can be compared with one of the empirical findings of Romer (NBER Working Paper 1989) 
who indicates that the initial level of literacy does help predict the subsequent rate of investment and, 
indirectly, the rate of growth. 
67 However, due to a possible correlation with the inflation variable, the private sector investment to GDP 
ratio is not always included in the function specification and it is replaced by openness in some regressions 
(see for example the GMM method presented in table 7). 
 17
many of these countries, other charges and fees (often for the use of government 
services) have been levied on the population with a negative impact on growth. 
 
• The net effect of fiscal policy has also been estimated by calculating the sum of 
the coefficients of expenditures, revenues, and the fiscal surplus in Table 5 (using 
productive and non-productive expenditures with OLS).  The sum of all fiscal 
variable coefficients in this regression is 0.694 and its standard deviation is 0.193.  
This result produces a t-statistics almost equal to 3.6 which indicates a statistical 
significance at 5 percent of the joint effect of all fiscal variables. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the net effect of fiscal policy is positive and statistically 
significant. 
 
• Unfortunately, the results obtained when using the interactive governance variable 
are not significant68.  Part of the reason is surely the lack of a sufficiently long 
series of relevant governance indexes—a problem that could be overcome in 
future work by using a larger country sample. 
 
• Similarly, the public spending efficiency effects are not fully captured, given data 
limitations69. 
 
RESULTS WITH COUNTRY EFFECTS 
 
The results reported in the previous section are obtained by pooling all data information 
for each country without taking into account specific country effects.  Since it is expected 
that the effects of economic and social, or productive and unproductive, public 
expenditures on growth may vary per country, in this section the growth equation is 
estimated including country-specific variables.  This approach is particularly useful here, 
given that the sample of countries is relatively small.  Due to constraints related to 
degrees of freedom, however, the country-specific effects are estimated one by one. 
 
Table 10 (OLS) reports the results using Criteria (1) and annual data. The interactive 
dummy variables are constructed, for instance for economic expenditure in Botswana, as 
follows70: 
 
 
 
The interactive dummy variables for economic expenditures (abstracting from country 
differences in terms of social expenditures) have an expected positive sign for each  
 
1*economic expenditure if the country is Botswana  
 
0 otherwise.
Interactive dummy for economic 
expenditure in Botswana = 
 
                                                 
68 Results are available upon request. 
69 Results are also available upon request. 
70 A separate interactive dummy variable was not introduced for Indonesia to prevent the perfect 
multicollinearity problem.  
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The interactive dummy variables for economic expenditures (abstracting from country 
differences in terms of social expenditures) have an expected positive sign for each 
country except for Indonesia71.   
 
The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 5 percent for Botswana, and at 10 
percent for Malaysia. The value of the coefficient is highest for these two countries, 
indicating where economic public expenditure had the strongest effect on growth.  
 
One explanation for the negative sign in Indonesia could be the fact that, due to data 
limitations, only central government expenditures are included in the analysis.  General 
government expenditure would have been more appropriate due to the high degree of 
decentralization of government activities in the country. 
 
The results with the interactive dummy for social public expenditure (abstracting from 
country differences in terms of economic expenditures) suggest that these expenditures 
also have a positive impact on growth for each country except for Indonesia, Korea, and 
Thailand, and is not statistically significant for Singapore (despite having the correct 
sign). The coefficients are statistically significant for the other countries.  Their 
significance level is 1 percent for Botswana, 5 percent for Mauritius, and 10 percent for 
Malaysia. These results indicate that, in several countries of the sample (Botswana, 
Malaysia, and Mauritius), social expenditures are as essential as economic expenditures 
for economic growth, particularly in the short term.  However, for Singapore, the impact 
of social expenditures appears to be less than the impact of economic expenditures, as 
measured by the coefficients of both variables. 
 
As in the previous section, the same specifications are rerun using 3-year averages in an 
attempt to capture better the medium-run effects of different components of public 
expenditure on growth. Table 11 shows the results with economic versus social 
expenditure for each country. The coefficients for economic expenditures (abstracting 
from country differences in terms of social expenditures) are positive but not statistically 
significant; they remain negative for Indonesia.  This indicates that the effects detected in 
Table 10 are only transitional. 
 
Table 12 (OLS) reports the regression results when interactive country dummies are 
introduced for productive and unproductive public expenditure using Criterion (2) and 
annual data. When looking at the results in the first column, we can see that for 
productive expenditures (abstracting from country differences in terms of unproductive 
expenditures) all coefficients have the expected positive sign and they are statistically 
significant at a 5 percent level for Botswana, Malaysia, and Mauritius. These results 
indicate that the effect of productive public expenditure on growth is stronger in those 
three countries.  In addition, in the regression with the lagged dependent variables, the 
coefficients for Korea and Singapore are borderline significant at 10 percent level. 
                                                 
71 One country must be dropped, because the original variable appears as well in the equation; otherwise, 
there would be perfect colinearity among regressors. The results for Indonesia are therefore captured by the 
difference between the coefficient of the original variable in the regression and the country-specific 
coefficients. 
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The coefficient for Indonesia is calculated as the difference between the coefficient of the 
original variable and the country-specific coefficients.  It has a negative sign even though 
it is statistically insignificant. 
 
It is important to notice that in the regression results with country effects, the coefficients 
of the other variables do not change with respect to the results presented in the previous 
sections.  Similarly, the exclusion of the lagged growth rate as a regressor does not 
change the initial findings72. 
 
The results with the country-specific effects introduced for unproductive expenditure 
(abstracting from country differences in terms of productive expenditures) are also 
presented in Table 12.  The coefficients have a positive sign for Botswana, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, and Thailand. But none of them is statistically significant. These results imply 
that unproductive expenditures do not seem to exert any significant effect on economic 
growth.  
 
Overall, as expected, it can be concluded that at the country level productive public 
expenditures are clearly much more relevant in explaining growth changes than 
unproductive ones even in the short term.    
 
Table 13 shows the results of the same regression but using the OLS method and 3-year 
averages.  In general, the sign of coefficients remain similar, but the statistical 
significance of the country-specific variables drops significantly.  
 
Finally, in order to further understand the effects of some critical sectoral components of 
public expenditure for each country, different regression specifications are run with the 
interactive country dummies for: education, health, and transportation (Criterion 3, see 
Page 8). The results are presented in Table 14, in each case focusing, as before, on 
country-specific effects associated with one sectoral component at a time, to preserve 
degrees of freedom. The interactive dummy variables are constructed, for example for 
education expenditure in Botswana, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When looking at the results with the interactive dummy for education, all countries have 
the expected positive sign, again except Indonesia73.   
 
                                                 
72This is to be expected, given that averaging reduces the need to capture persistence (and short-run 
dynamics) by adding the lagged dependent variable.  Results are not presented in the paper, but remain 
available upon request 
73 As before, this result can be partially explained by the fact that only central government expenditures are 
included.   In Indonesia some of the government services in these sectors are delivered at the sub-national 
level. 
Interactive dummy for education 
expenditure in Botswana = 
1*education expenditure if the country is Botswana  
 
0 otherwise. 
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The coefficients are statistically significant at 1 percent for Botswana, 5 percent for 
Botswana, Mauritius, and Thailand.  The large values of these coefficients indicate the 
importance of education expenditures in determining growth.  These results are consistent 
with those previously established by Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007), who also 
estimated the coefficient of education expenditure as being positive and statistically 
significant74.  
 
Similarly, public expenditures in health have a positive and significant impact on growth 
in each country except for Indonesia, as can be seen in Table 14.  The interactive dummy 
variable for health expenditure is significant at 1 percent for Botswana, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Singapore, and Thailand. As was the case for education, the estimated values 
of the coefficients are high, indicating the importance of health expenditure on growth at 
the individual country level.  
 
The last sectoral component of public expenditures included using the interactive dummy 
variable is public expenditure in transportation.  It has also highly significant coefficients 
and all positive, except for Indonesia75.   
 
Table 15 reports the results for public expenditure in the three (education, health, and 
transport and communications), using 3-year averages.  The estimated coefficients of 
education are much higher under this classification, and are significant at a 1 percent 
level for Botswana, and at a 5 percent level for Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The 
reason could be that, compared to other sectors, it takes a longer time for education 
expenditures to impact growth. 
 
The estimated coefficients of public expenditure in health are positive only for Botswana 
and Malaysia.  The negative coefficient for Indonesia was somehow expected due to the 
exclusion of expenditures at a decentralized level, which (as mentioned earlier) are quite 
important in Indonesia.  But the negative coefficient in Korea was not expected at all.  
One (econometric) reason might be having lower degrees of freedom due to the small 
number of observations available and the large number of regressors included in the 
specification.  It could also be possible that in some countries, such as Korea, public 
expenditures in health have not been able to cope with the emerging needs of a growing 
population.  In any case, these country results are somehow consistent with the findings 
of the cross-country analysis, which showed that health expenditures do not appear to 
have a direct effect on GDP growth in the medium-term.   
 
Table 15 also shows that the impact of public expenditure in transport and 
communication on economic growth appears to be statistically insignificant almost for 
each country, when using the OLS method with 3-year averages.  Botswana has a level of 
significance at 10 percent. But expenditure on transportation does not have any 
statistically significant effect on growth in other countries.    
                                                 
74 They use data from thirty developing countries during the period 1970-1990. 
75 For comparison purposes, the estimated value of transportation and communication expenditures by 
Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2003) is negative in one specification and positive in another specification, but 
none of them is statistically significant, as it can be seen in Table 3 of their paper. 
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Finally, Table 16, using SURE and 3-year averages, shows that while education has a 
positive and significant impact on growth in the medium-run in all countries (expect for 
Indonesia), the effects are rather mixed for the other two spending categories.  Korea has 
an unexpected and statistically significant negative sign for health, but insignificant 
coefficient for transportation expenditures.  Thailand has similarly an unexpected 
negative sign for health and transportation expenditures, but both of which are 
statistically insignificant.  Similarly, the coefficient of health expenditures in Mauritius is 
negative but insignificant76.  
 
Overall, we can conclude that, except for Indonesia, public expenditures in education 
are the only ones to clearly show both short and medium-run effects on growth. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The analysis presented in this paper leads to establishing an empirically robust 
relationship between public spending and GDP per capita growth.  Furthermore, in 
consistency with endogenous growth models, some medium-term effects of public 
spending on growth are also identified, particularly when differentiating by categories of 
spending.  Using a sample of seven fast-growing developing countries during the period 
1970-2006, several conclusions are drawn at the cross-country and individual country 
levels. 
 
Introducing the full government budget constraint has been essential to isolate the 
(positive) effect of public spending on growth while taking into account its sources of 
financing and their (negative) implications for growth.  When looking at the coefficients 
of public spending ratios together with the fiscal revenue and fiscal surplus ratios, it 
becomes clear that the net effect of public spending on growth has been positive in this 
country sample. 
 
Another strong conclusion relates to the importance of maintaining macroeconomic 
stability in order to ensure this positive contribution of public spending to growth.  In all 
functional specifications, the negative link between inflation and growth is strong, 
indicating that no trade-off exists between the need to maintain macroeconomic stability 
and changes in the composition of public spending.    
 
Besides the fiscal variables, private sector investment—which may have been positively 
influenced by government spending, particularly on infrastructure, as documented in 
other studies— appears to have been an important engine of growth in these countries.  
Similarly, the openness variable, when added to the regression, also exhibits a positive 
sign, indicating its influence on growth77. 
                                                 
76 We excluded Indonesia to prevent any near singularity problem that might be caused by inclusion of 
interactive variables for each country and cross-section SURE weights at the same time. 
77 This result is consistent with Romer’s findings (WB Working Paper 1989) indicating that policies to 
encourage more open trading may be as important to growth and technological change as additional foreign 
lending.  In many of the sample countries, open trade has become a crucial vehicle for the transfer of 
technologies, capital goods, and innovation policies. 
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Several expenditure classifications, according to three different criteria defined for the 
purpose of the analysis, have permitted a thorough assessment of the short and medium-
term effects on growth in our group of countries.  When dividing public expenditures 
between economic and social components (Criterion 1), a significant positive effect of 
economic expenditures is found both in the short and medium-term78.  On the contrary, 
social expenditures do not appear to be as critical for growth. 
 
When using the expenditure classification criteria defined by Bleaney et al., expenditures 
considered a priori as being productive (which include education and health 
expenditures, in addition to some economic expenditures such as transport and 
communications) are confirmed to be, indeed, the categories of spending that are most 
relevant for growth, particularly in the medium-run when unproductive spending is not 
significant at all.  According to this finding, reallocating 1% of unproductive spending 
towards the productive spending categories would lead to a 0.35 % increase in GDP per 
capita growth79, everything else being equal.   
 
This result is particularly relevant for policymakers as it implies that, when considered 
jointly with the bulk of economic expenditures, education and health have a positive 
impact on growth, both in the short and the medium-term.  The immediate policy 
implication is that for education and health expenditures to influence growth over the 
medium and long-term, they would have to be executed (and planned) in conjunction 
with most economic expenditures, and not in isolation from them80.  It is important to 
note, however, that the positive effect of public spending on education and health may be 
capturing an indirect effect of spending on infrastructure, given the importance of 
externalities (discussed in Section II) associated with the latter category of spending for 
education and health outcomes.  
 
The results obtained at the individual country level seem to confirm the findings of the 
cross-country analysis, with some peculiarities for each country.  Indonesia is an 
exception, most likely due to the omission of expenditures at a decentralized level.  Some 
country-specific results are particularly worth noticing, most notably the confirmation 
that in all the selected countries public spending in education has been critical to affect 
the path of GDP growth in the medium-term81. 
 
Our econometric results have important implications for the debate on the design of fiscal 
rules in a growth context82.  Some economists have advocated the use of a “golden rule”, 
whereby the focus is on maintaining a balance or surplus on the current fiscal account 
(that is, current revenues less current expenditures), with net capital expenditure financed 
                                                 
78 This result is however not confirmed by GMM. 
79 0.35 is calculated by subtracting the coefficient of non-productive expenditures (0.312) from the 
coefficient for productive expenditures (0.664). See Table 5. 
80 For example, education and health public spending strategies should take into consideration 
transportation access and, vice versa, infrastructure strategies should be planned taking into account health 
and education needs. 
81 This result is consistent with the existing literature on the links between human capital accumulation and 
growth.  See for example Aghion, Meghir, and Vandenbussche (2004). 
82 See Agénor and Yilmaz (2006), and Servén (2007). 
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from government savings and borrowing (see Giavazzi and Blanchard (2004))83. A 
common criticism of this rule is that it is vulnerable to creative accounting.   
 
Another important limitation, as implied by our results, is that a preferential treatment of 
physical investment could bias expenditure decisions against spending on other 
potentially productive components, such as current expenditures in education and 
health—with therefore a detrimental effect on growth.  Moreover, some components of 
current spending, such as maintenance of roads, schools, and hospitals, may be equally 
important to maintain the quality of the services financed by public capital.  Our results 
regarding the growth effects of total (capital and current) public spending on education 
and health support this view.  The key question therefore is where to “draw the line” in 
the design of growth-enhancing fiscal rules. 
 
Our analysis has been mainly “positive”, trying to explain what happened in the seven 
selected countries during the period of analysis.  If we now attempt to modestly move to 
a rather “normative” mode, trying to explore the lessons that these seven fast growing 
countries could offer to other parts of the world, several conclusions can be drawn.  
Based on qualitative facts and the empirical results, it would be fair to say that public 
spending exerts a positive impact on GDP per capita growth in a policy context where: 
 
• Macroeconomic stability is sustained. 
 
• The size of the government budget remains relatively small84 in order to avoid 
jeopardizing fiscal stability and government effectiveness85. 
 
• The composition of public spending evolves as growth dynamics unfold to focus 
on those productive sectors/activities that are more conducive to growth.  In this 
respect, policy makers should plan and implement jointly social and economic 
spending, as part of an integrated strategy, and attempt to gradually reduce 
allocations to unproductive spending—despite the fact that distinguishing a priori 
between productive and unproductive outlays may not always be easy. 
 
• The government continues relying on the private domestic sector and foreign 
transactions (for example imports of capital goods), in order to leverage domestic 
human and physical capital, and to allow public spending to focus on 
sectors/activities where it is contributing to growth the most86. 
                                                 
83 More precisely, under the Blanchard-Giavazzi rule, governments should borrow in net terms on a 
continuous basis only to the extent that this net borrowing finances net public investment, that is, gross 
investment less capital depreciation (which counts as current spending). This rule therefore would allow 
gross borrowing for the purpose of refinancing maturing debt, thereby leaving net debt unaffected. 
84 This result is consistent with Barro’s 1990 model and Tanzi’s 2008 conclusions (see page 9). 
85 Although the empirical analysis does not demonstrate it, the qualitative country case studies indicate 
how essential it is that temporary increases in government spending (for countercyclical purposes, 
industrial policy interventionist episodes, crisis recovery, or others) do not undermine government 
effectiveness, transparency, and good governance.   
86 This implication is derived from the significance found for the variables private sector investment and 
openness with respect to growth, in addition to the positive effect of productive public spending.   
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ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Despite the relevance of the results presented, it is important to mention three main 
caveats:  
 
a) In future work, it would be important to extend the sample size to further tests for the 
robustness of the results; in particular introducing a comparison group including less 
good performers in terms of GDP per capita growth would allow us to explore further the 
extent to which public expenditure contribute to growth, and whether there are clear 
differences between fast and slow-growing economies;  
 
b) The quality of public spending should be taken into account more accurately in 
connection with the governance variable, in light of recent results showing that 
governance can largely explain differences in the impact of public spending on human 
development indicators (see Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008)); and  
 
c) Finally, although in the focus of this paper is solely on measuring the impact of public 
spending on growth, an important issue to address in future research is what determines 
governments' decisions to allocate spending among various components--in particular, 
the role of demographic factors and the nature of the political process.  Surprisingly 
enough, there has been limited analytical and empirical research on these two possible 
determinants of government spending behavior.  Much of the existing literature (alluded 
to earlier) on the optimal allocation of public expenditure in a growth context has ignored 
demographic and political considerations.  At the same time, there is robust evidence 
suggesting that the composition of public spending depends on the demographic structure 
of the population and political factors as well.  
 
For instance, using data for a large group of industrial and developing countries, Shelton 
(2007) found that a greater fraction of the population above 65 tends to be accompanied 
by higher levels of government expenditure on health care, public order and safety—
possibly a reflection of the ability of the “old” to exploit the political process to their 
advantage.  But such bias, to the extent that it is systematic, may result in large adverse 
effects on infrastructure investment and growth--and eventually the welfare of old and 
young generations alike.  Thus, an important avenue for future research could be to 
extend our growth regression framework to a multi-equation setting, so as to account for 
the endogeneity of government spending choices. 
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TABLES 
 
Country Comparison Tables 
 
 
          
GDP Per Capita  Public Spending Fiscal Balance 
Gini 
Coefficient Country  Year 
Growth % GDP % GDP Year   
1970-1979 11.93% 25.53% -4.53%     
1980-1989 8.00% 32.53% 9.65% 1986 54.21 
1990-1999 3.74% 36.91% 5.32% 1993 60.507
Botswana 
2000-2005 5.60% 38.83% 0.44%     
1970-1979 5.27% 14.69% -2.68% 1987 33.12 
1980-1989 4.18% 21.17% -3.59% 1993 34.36 
1990-1999 2.84% 17.23% -0.85% 1998 38.36 
Indonesia 
2000-2005 3.37% 18.33% -1.09% 2005 39.41 
1970-1979 6.35% 15.48% -0.79%     
1980-1989 7.43% 15.91% 0.19%     
1990-1999 4.52% 16.39% 0.97% 1998 31.59 
Korea, Rep. 
2000-2005 4.60% 20.71% 1.52%     
1970-1979 5.39% 18.96% -5.06% 1984 48.63 
1980-1989 3.18% 30.58% -7.64% 1989 46.17 
1990-1999 4.52% 24.23% 0.00% 1995 48.52 
Malaysia 
2000-2005 3.15% 26.99% -5.40% 1997 49.15 
1970-1979 0.00% 30.16% -11.28%     
1980-1989 4.90% 26.81% -6.62%   None 
1990-1999 4.24% 23.59% -3.26%     
Mauritius 
2000-2005 3.15% 24.36% -3.32%     
1970-1979 7.55% 18.07% 0.69%     
1980-1989 5.32% 24.99% 2.68%     
1990-1999 4.39% 15.60% 7.80% 1998 42.476
Singapore 
2000-2005 4.13% 16.58% 4.73%     
1970-1979 4.83% 12.39% -2.17% 1981 45.22 
1980-1989 5.48% 18.39% -3.53% 1992 46.22 
1990-1999 3.99% 17.61% -0.25% 1996 43.39 
Thailand 
2000-2005 4.08% 16.33% -1.14% 2002 41.978
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Country Year PRODUCTIVE SOCIAL ECONOMIC Education Health Transport
1970-1979 70.87% 35.67% 31.37% 16.54% 5.66% 13.71%
1980-1989 74.55% 35.59% 26.32% 19.23% 5.52% 9.92%
1990-1999 79.43% 39.97% 15.46% 23.01% 5.22% 6.76%
2000-2005 76.12% 32.00% 23.52% 8.48%
1970-1979 42.61% 12.67% 34.55% 8.42% 2.03% 12.24%
1980-1989 72.20% 13.68% 30.52% 9.24% 2.14% 8.88%
1990-1999 67.50% 28.81% 22.21% 8.68% 2.55% 7.06%
2000-2005 65.47% 6.76% 1.87% 2.93% 1.33% 1.09%
1970-1979 75.92% 24.54% 21.04% 16.05% 1.28% 5.15%
1980-1989 68.31% 29.08% 16.10% 18.83% 1.70% 3.68%
1990-1999 56.54% 33.63% 21.97% 19.22% 0.80% 6.96%
2000-2005 61.73% 35.01% 24.96% 15.38% 0.45% 6.67%
1970-1979 61.65% 34.74% 15.65% 22.45% 6.71% 5.87%
1980-1989 54.69% 31.49% 25.39% 18.80% 4.85% 8.36%
1990-1999 49.44% 20.43% 20.95% 5.85% 8.02%
2000-2005 63.50% 18.36% 24.60% 7.06% 8.03%
1970-1979 53.37% 47.68% 15.98% 14.10% 8.50% 4.30%
1980-1989 50.86% 43.36% 14.96% 14.86% 7.78% 4.50%
1990-1999 50.59% 48.97% 14.43% 15.95% 8.56% 4.37%
2000-2005 53.56% 52.34% 12.32% 15.74% 8.70% 3.40%
1970-1979 83.24% 33.78% 11.04% 16.74% 7.89% 5.31%
1980-1989 72.95% 34.96% 16.58% 18.62% 5.72% 8.01%
1990-1999 69.41% 46.13% 16.00% 24.24% 7.67% 6.02%
2000-2005 86.79% 45.43% 15.38% 23.70% 6.65% 7.82%
1970-1979 70.32% 32.15% 23.25% 20.70% 4.11% 10.29%
1980-1989 67.23% 30.41% 22.24% 19.64% 5.41% 7.02%
1990-1999 65.78% 36.12% 30.92% 20.38% 7.51% 11.28%
2000-2005 71.52% 43.09% 26.27% 21.15% 8.97% 7.11%
Mauritius
Singapore
Thailand
Public Spending Composition
Botswana
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
 
Percentile Rank Governance Score Percentile Rank Governance Score
1996 68.9 0.38 67.3 0.24
2006 78.2 0.81 73.9 0.74
1996 31.1 -0.55 64 0.14
2006 23.3 -0.77 40.8 -0.38
1996 73.8 0.52 80.6 0.92
2006 64.6 0.31 82.9 1.05
1996 73.3 0.49 79.6 0.85
2006 68 0.38 80.6 1.02
1996 71.8 0.45 73.5 0.46
2006 66.5 0.37 71.6 0.63
1996 97.6 2.25 99.5 2.28
2006 98.1 2.3 99.5 2.2
1996 38.3 -0.39 72.5 0.44
2006 50.5 -0.26 64.9 0.29
Corruption Control Government EfficiencyYearCountry 
Mauritius
Singapore
Thailand
Botswana
Indonesia
Korea, Rep.
Malaysia
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Table 1: Results with Total Public Expenditures (panel 
OLS and SURE) 
         
    
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita  
         
 OLS  SURE 
        
    
Private investment 0.107  0.115 
(% of GDP) (1.917)*  (2.698)*** 
  
Initial human capital 0.007  0.006 
 (0.96) (0.931)
  
Total fiscal revenues -0.323  -0.296 
(% of GDP) (-3.884)***  (-4.175)*** 
  
Productive plus unproductive expenditures (-1) 0.477  0.448 
(% of GDP) (3.876)***  (4.263)*** 
  
Budget surplus  0.341  0.304 
(% of GDP) (3.668)***  (3.942)*** 
  
Inflation - consumer price index -0.205  -0.177 
 (-5.65)*** (-4.908)***
  
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.406  0.378 
 (3.928)*** (4.11)***
  
  
No. of observations 120  120 
Adjusted R2 0.443  0.473 
         
 
     
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data in the first column and the 
cross‐section seeminly unrelated regression for panel data in the second column. Annual data are used. (-1) 
indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance 
level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% signif icance level. These signif icance 
levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.  
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Total fiscal revenue -0.214
(% of GDP) (-0.521)
Total fiscal expenditures (-1) 0.387
(% of GDP) (1.774)*
Budget surplus 0.014
(% of GDP) (0.062)
Inflation - consumer price index -0.327
(-3.511)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.167
(0.899)
No. of observations 94
J-statistics 7.542
Table 2: Results with Total Public Expenditures 
(Dynamic Panel - GMM)
Note: The estimation method is a dynamic GMM. Annual data are used. (-1) 
indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * 
indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** 
indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one 
minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. J-test 
is for overidentification problem where H0: there is no overidentification 
problem. We fail to reject in each case.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Private investment 0.098
(% of GDP) (1.594)
Initial human capital 0.007
(0.704)
Tax revenue -0.106
(% of GDP) (-0.93)
Other revenue -0.089
(% of GDP) (-1.077)
Economic expenditure (-1) 0.33
(% of GDP) (1.722)*
Social expenditure (-1) 0.09
(% of GDP) (0.568)
Budget surplus 0.17
(% of GDP) (1.734)*
Inflation - consumer price index -0.207
(-5.322)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.39
(3.499)***
No. of observations 122
Adjusted R2 0.37
Table 3: Results with Economic and Social 
Expenditures (panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. 
Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics 
are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% 
significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These 
significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
OLS SURE
Initial human capital 0.028 0.022
(1.764)* (1.532)
Tax revenue -0.230 -0.165
(% of GDP) (-0.972) (-1.084)
Other revenue -0.299 -0.284
(% of GDP) (-2.462)** (-3.449)***
Economic expenditure (-1) 1.083 0.988
(% of GDP) (2.613)** (3.161)***
Social expenditure (-1) 0.194 0.063
(% of GDP) (0.679) (0.314)
Budget surplus 0.495 0.462
(% of GDP) (3.135)*** (3.707)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.002 -0.002
(-2.711)** (-3.642)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.05 0.007
(0.192) (0.045)
No. of observations 35 35
Adjusted R2 0.279 0.525
Table 4: Results with Economic and Social Expenditures          
(panel OLS and SURE with 3-year averages)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data in the first column and 
the cross-section seeminly unrelated regression for panel data in the second column. 3-year 
averages are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in 
parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** 
indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability 
of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
OLS
Private investment 0.071
(% of GDP) (1.235)
Initial human capital 0.007
(0.987)
Tax revenue -0.201
(% of GDP) (-1.877)*
Other revenue -0.531
(% of GDP) (-4.051)***
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.664
(% of GDP) (4.314)***
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.312
(% of GDP) (1.786)*
Budget surplus 0.450
(% of GDP) (4.182)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.208
(-5.76)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.377
(3.644)***
No. of observations 120
Adjusted R2 0.454
Table 5: Results with Productive and Non-
productive Expenditures (panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. 
Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics 
are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% 
significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance 
levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
of zero coefficients.
 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
OLS SURE
Initial human capital 0.016 0.015
(1.524) (1.685)
Tax revenue -0.039 0.004
(% of GDP) (-0.166) (0.029)
Other revenue -0.644 -0.583
(% of GDP) (-4.256)*** (-5.456)***
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.720 0.669
(% of GDP) (3.176)*** (4.071)***
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.082 -0.007
(% of GDP) (0.222) (-0.037)
Budget surplus 0.630 0.529
(% of GDP) (4.971)*** (5.981)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.232 -0.188
(-3.318)*** (-3.664)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.053 -0.098
(-0.205) (-0.576)
No. of observations 34 34
Adjusted R2 0.475 0.579
Table 6: Results with Productive and Non-productive 
Expenditures (panel OLS and SURE with 3-year averages)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data in the first column and 
the cross-section seeminly unrelated regression for panel data in the second column. (-1) 
indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% 
significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. 
These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
of zero coefficients.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
With openness
Initial human capital -0.030
(-0.151)
Openness 0.058
(% of GDP) (1.834)*
Tax revenue -0.153
(% of GDP) (-0.355)
Other revenue -0.400
(% of GDP) (-0.905)
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.777
(% of GDP) (1.673)*
Non-productive expenditure (-1) -0.890
(% of GDP) (-1.301)
Budget surplus 0.126
(% of GDP) (0.316)
Inflation - consumer price index -0.375
(-3.12)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.03
(-0.151)
No. of observations 98
J-test 1.993
Table 7: Results with Productive and Non-
productive Expenditures (Dynamic Panel - GMM)
Note: The estimation method is a dynamic GMM. Annual data are used. 
(-1) indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in 
parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% 
significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These 
significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis of zero coefficients. J-test is for overidentification 
problem where H0: there is no overidentification problem. We fail to 
reject in each case.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Bleaney, 
Gemmell, and 
Kneller (2001) 
Table 1 on page 
44 (Column 1)
Our results with 
initial human 
capital index 
and lagged 
budget 
variables
(5-year 
averages)
(3-year 
averages)
Investment 0.020 -0.004
(0.32) (-3.53)
Labor force growth -0.015 ---
(-0.05)
Initial human capital index --- 0.011
(1.09)
Taxation -0.222 (lagged)
(-1.17)
Non-tax revenues -0.101 -0.425
(-0.51) (-2.60)
Other expenditures 0.301 ---
(1.82)
Budget surplus 0.357 0.504
(2.17) (4.51)
Distortionary taxation -0.427 ---
(-2.36)
Productive expenditure 0.273 0.481 (lagged)
(1.77) (2.27)
Non-productive expenditure -0.039 0.223 (lagged)
(-0.23) (0.76)
Net lending 0.314 ---
(1.32)
No of observations 98 34
Adj-R2 0.574 0.508
Table 8 - Comparison with Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller (2001) Table 1 on 
page 44 (OLS methdology)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. In our case, the 
lagged values of some budget variables are used, specified as (lagged). t-statistics are given 
in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** 
indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Private investment 0.072
(% of GDP) (1.238)
Initial human capital 0.006
(0.791)
Tax revenue -0.213
(% of GDP) (-1.895)*
Other revenue -0.540
(% of GDP) (-4.039)***
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.826
(% of GDP) (1.756)*
Square term of Productive expenditure (-1) -0.464
(% of GDP) (-0.365)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.316
(% of GDP) (1.799)*
Budget surplus 0.463
(% of GDP) (4.073)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.205
(-5.456)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.376
(3.617)***
No. of observations 120
Adjusted R2 0.449
Table 9: Nonlinearity of Productive Expenditures (panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1) 
indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance 
level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance 
levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
With Economic 
expenditure country 
effects 
With Social 
expenditure country 
effects
Private investment 0.090 0.118
(% of GDP) (1.287) (1.726)*
Initial human capital 0.006 0.037
(0.24) (0.976)
Tax revenue -0.267 -0.259
(% of GDP) (-1.974)* (-2.077)**
Other revenue -0.181 -0.329
(% of GDP) (-1.207) (-2.182)**
Economic expenditure (-1) -0.664 0.325
(% of GDP) (-1.307) (1.84)*
Social expenditure (-1) -0.130 -1.340
(% of GDP) (-0.575) (-3.251)***
Budget surplus 0.255 0.263
(% of GDP) (1.946)* (2.299)**
Inflation - consumer price index -0.242 -0.288
(-5.976)*** (-7.168)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.212 0.151
(1.84)* (1.422)
Botswana-Economic expenditure (-1) 1.259 …
(% of GDP) (2.549)**
Korea-Economic expenditure (-1) 0.331 …
(% of GDP) (0.409)
Malaysia-Economic expenditure (-1) 1.093 …
(% of GDP) (1.879)*
Mauritius-Economic expenditure (-1) 0.929 …
(% of GDP) (1.552)
Singapore-Economic expenditure (-1) 0.202 …
(% of GDP) (0.179)
Thailand-Economic expenditure (-1) 0.282 …
(% of GDP) (0.661)
Botswana-Social expenditure (-1) … 1.438
(% of GDP) (4.506)***
Korea-Social expenditure (-1) … -0.651
(% of GDP) (-0.862)
Malaysia-Social expenditure (-1) … 0.741
(% of GDP) (1.871)*
Mauritius-Social expenditure (-1) … 0.773
(% of GDP) (2.16)**
Singapore-Social expenditure (-1) … 0.105
(% of GDP) (0.151)
Thailand-Social expenditure (-1) … -0.078
(% of GDP) (-0.298)
No. of observations 122 122
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.526
Table 10: Results with Economic and Social Expenditures with country effects 
(panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1) 
indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance 
level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance 
levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
With Economic 
expenditure country 
effects 
With Social 
expenditure country 
effects
Private investment 0.092 0.121
(% of GDP) (0.816) (0.939)
Tax revenue -0.31 -0.428
(% of GDP) (-1.279) (-1.616)
Other revenue -0.469 -0.441
(% of GDP) (-2.045)* (-1.471)
Economic expenditure (-1) -49.776 0.472
(% of GDP) (-0.864) (1.161)
Social expenditure (-1) -0.29 -41.124
(% of GDP) (-0.698) (-0.988)
Budget surplus 0.513 0.541
(% of GDP) (2.396)** (2.321)**
Inflation - consumer price index -0.001 -0.002
(-0.876) (-1.899)*
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.491 -0.293
(-1.965)* (-1.198)
Botswana-Economic expenditure (-1) 50.525 …
(% of GDP) (0.881)
Korea-Economic expenditure (-1) 48.358 …
(% of GDP) (0.842)
Malaysia-Economic expenditure (-1) 50.175 …
(% of GDP) (0.873)
Mauritius-Economic expenditure (-1) 49.431 …
(% of GDP) (0.859)
Singapore-Economic expenditure (-1) 49.767 …
(% of GDP) (0.874)
Thailand-Economic expenditure (-1) 48.526 …
(% of GDP) (0.843)
Botswana-Social expenditure (-1) … 40.965
(% of GDP) (0.989)
Korea-Social expenditure (-1) … 39.327
(% of GDP) (0.948)
Malaysia-Social expenditure (-1) … 40.752
(% of GDP) (0.98)
Mauritius-Social expenditure (-1) … 40.55
(% of GDP) (0.975)
Singapore-Social expenditure (-1) … 40.348
(% of GDP) (0.98)
Thailand-Social expenditure (-1) … 39.336
(% of GDP) (0.946)
No. of observations 35 35
Adjusted R2 0.624 0.641
Table 11: Results with Economic and Social Expenditures with country effects 
(panel OLS with 3-year averages)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1) 
indicates variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance 
level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance 
levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
With productive 
expenditure country 
effects and lagged 
growth rate of GDP 
per capita
With non-
productive 
expenditure country 
effects and lagged 
growth rate of GDP 
per capita
Private investment 0.087 0.133
(% of GDP) (1.261) (1.864)*
Initial human capital -0.068 0.032
(-1.28) (1.172)
Tax revenue -0.377 -0.371
(% of GDP) (-2.623)*** (-2.693)***
Other revenue -0.578 -0.451
(% of GDP) (-3.883)*** (-2.766)***
Productive expenditure (-1) -0.410 0.529
(% of GDP) (-0.869) (2.955)***
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.190 -0.250
(% of GDP) (0.802) (-0.515)
Budget surplus 0.464 0.444
(% of GDP) (3.512)*** (3.095)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.223 -0.221
(-5.61)*** (-5.617)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.247 0.254
(2.28)** (2.33)**
Botswana-Productive expenditure (-1) 0.728 …
(% of GDP) (2.36)**
Korea-Productive expenditure (-1) 0.958 …
(% of GDP) (1.75)*
Malaysia-Productive expenditure (-1) 0.888 …
(% of GDP) (2.513)**
Mauritius-Productive expenditure (-1) 0.760 …
(% of GDP) (2.248)**
Singapore-Productive expenditure (-1) 1.003 …
(% of GDP) (1.882)*
Thailand-Productive expenditure (-1) 0.289 …
(% of GDP) (1.391)
Botswana-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 0.880
(% of GDP) (1.508)
Korea-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … -0.361
(% of GDP) (-0.463)
Malaysia-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 0.662
(% of GDP) (1.131)
Mauritius-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 0.394
(% of GDP) (0.82)
Singapore-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … -1.468
(% of GDP) (-0.937)
Thailand-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 0.067
(% of GDP) (0.165)
No. of observations 120 120
Adjusted R2 0.481 0.478
Table 12: Results with Productive and Non-productive Expenditures with country effects 
(panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates 
variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 
5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus 
the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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 Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
With productive 
expenditure country 
effects and lagged 
growth rate of GDP 
per capita
With non-
productive 
expenditure country 
effects and lagged 
growth rate of GDP 
per capita
Private investment 0.136 0.112
(% of GDP) (1.088) (0.956)
Tax revenue -0.218 -0.270
(% of GDP) (-0.697) (-0.935)
Other revenue -0.519 -0.597
(% of GDP) (-2.095)** (-2.417)**
Productive expenditure (-1) -32.555 0.101
(% of GDP) (-1.126) (0.34)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.306 -57.457
(% of GDP) (0.474) (-0.991)
Budget surplus 0.593 0.595
(% of GDP) (2.86)*** (2.85)**
Inflation - consumer price index -0.001 -0.001
(-0.632) (-0.788)
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.416 -0.421
(-1.393) (-1.493)
Botswana-Productive expenditure (-1) 32.805 …
(% of GDP) (1.137)
Korea-Productive expenditure (-1) 32.493 …
(% of GDP) (1.12)
Malaysia-Productive expenditure (-1) 32.871 …
(% of GDP) (1.132)
Mauritius-Productive expenditure (-1) 32.512 …
(% of GDP) (1.116)
Singapore-Productive expenditure (-1) 32.764 …
(% of GDP) (1.137)
Thailand-Productive expenditure (-1) 32.431 …
(% of GDP) (1.117)
Botswana-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 58.492
(% of GDP) (1.015)
Korea-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 56.875
(% of GDP) (0.984)
Malaysia-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 58.147
(% of GDP) (1.004)
Mauritius-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 57.355
(% of GDP) (0.99)
Singapore-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 58.511
(% of GDP) (1.028)
Thailand-Non-productive expenditure (-1) … 56.587
(% of GDP) (0.978)
No. of observations 34 34
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.58
Table 13: Results with Productive and Non-productive Expenditures with country effects 
(OLS with 3-year averages)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. 3-year averages are used. (-1) indicates 
variables lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% 
significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Components 
of productive 
expenditure 
and lagged 
growth rate of 
GDP per 
capita
Education 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Health 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Trasportation 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Private investment 0.087 0.177 0.139 0.121
(% of GDP) (1.438) (2.478)** (2.074)** (1.95)*
Initial human capital -0.002 -0.005 -0.026 -0.040
(-0.15) (-0.104) (-1.004) (-1.883)*
Tax revenue -0.161 -0.377 -0.332 -0.402
(% of GDP) (-1.355) (-2.667)*** (-2.429)** (-2.975)***
Other revenue -0.537 -0.484 -0.509 -0.529
(% of GDP) (-3.975)*** (-2.986)*** (-3.346)*** (-3.599)***
Education expenditure (-1) 0.442 -5.981 -1.447 -0.791
(% of GDP) (1.013) (-2.193)** (-2.319)** (-1.329)
Health expenditure (-1) 0.349 -1.328 -17.460 0.273
(% of GDP) (0.537) (-0.928) (-3.271)*** (0.253)
Transportation expenditure (-1) 0.317 0.342 -0.120 -5.932
(% of GDP) (0.763) (0.707) (-0.266) (-2.931)***
Other productive expenditure (-1) 0.829 0.967 0.793 0.870
(% of GDP) (3.781)*** (3.488)*** (2.897)*** (3.52)***
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.389 0.413 0.419 0.238
(% of GDP) (2.08)** (1.587) (1.671)* (1.047)
Budget surplus 0.410 0.428 0.347 0.464
(% of GDP) (3.52)*** (3.278)*** (2.797)*** (3.47)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.227 -0.274 -0.283 -0.254
(-5.521)*** (-6.61)*** (-7.198)*** (-6.402)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.357 0.169 0.159 0.135
(3.391)*** (1.572) (1.536) (1.238)
Botswana-Education expenditure (-1) … 5.577 … …
(% of GDP) (2.636)***
Korea-Education expenditure (-1) … 3.602 … …
(% of GDP) (1.249)
Malaysia-Education expenditure (-1) … 5.805 … …
(% of GDP) (2.489)**
Mauritius-Education expenditure (-1) … 5.448 … …
(% of GDP) (2.486)**
Singapore-Education expenditure (-1) … 4.407 … …
(% of GDP) (1.54)
Thailand-Education expenditure (-1) … 4.385 … …
(% of GDP) (2.359)**
Botswana-Health expenditure (-1) … … 20.872 …
(% of GDP) (4.046)***
Korea-Health expenditure (-1) … … 10.741 …
(% of GDP) (1.18)
Malaysia-Health expenditure (-1) … … 20.165 …
(% of GDP) (3.705)***
Mauritius-Health expenditure (-1) … … 17.541 …
(% of GDP) (3.434)***
Singapore-Health expenditure (-1) … … 17.519 …
(% of GDP) (3.009)***
Thailand-Health expenditure (-1) … … 14.857 …
(% of GDP) (3.158)***
Botswana-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 6.538
(% of GDP) (3.384)***
Korea-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 5.172
(% of GDP) (1.933)*
Malaysia-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 8.181
(% of GDP) (3.735)***
Mauritius-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 6.731
(% of GDP) (3.316)***
Singapore-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 6.084
(% of GDP) (2.337)**
Thailand-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 4.112
(% of GDP) (2.455)**
No. of observations 120 120 120 120
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.519 0.549 0.521
Table 14: Results with Components of Productive Expenditures (panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one 
period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 
1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero
coefficients.  
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Components of 
productive 
expenditure and 
lagged growth 
rate of GDP per 
capita
Education 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Health 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Trasportation 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Initial human capital 0.043 0.018 0.078 0.014
(2.224)** (0.294) (1.555) (0.372)
Tax revenue -0.078 -0.18 -0.490 -0.186
(% of GDP) (-0.329) (-0.586) (-1.494) (-0.556)
Other revenue -0.654 -1.013 -0.649 -0.493
(% of GDP) (-4.252)*** (-4.593)*** (-3.767)*** (-2.574)**
Education expenditure (-1) 2.687 … … …
(% of GDP) (2.526)**
Health expenditure (-1) 0.321 … … …
(% of GDP) (0.296)
Transportation expenditure (-1) 0.916 … … …
(% of GDP) (1.176)
Other productive expenditure (-1) -0.075 -0.432 0.137 0.211
(% of GDP) (-0.157) (-0.853) (0.316) (0.42)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) -0.208 0.624 0.368 -0.295
(% of GDP) (-0.478) (1.051) (0.609) (-0.498)
Budget surplus 0.783 0.91 0.706 0.608
(% of GDP) (4.741)*** (4.801)*** (3.897)*** (2.922)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.001 0 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.55) (-0.129) (-2.948)*** (-2.647)**
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.140 -0.309 0.107 -0.189
(-0.527) (-1.141) (0.356) (-0.585)
Botswana-Education expenditure (-1) … 3.681 … …
(% of GDP) (3.716)***
Korea-Education expenditure (-1) … 2.451 … …
(% of GDP) (1.177)
Malaysia-Education expenditure (-1) … 2.845 … …
(% of GDP) (2.83)**
Mauritius-Education expenditure (-1) … 1.727 … …
(% of GDP) (1.403)
Singapore-Education expenditure (-1) … 4.75 … …
(% of GDP) (2.361)**
Thailand-Education expenditure (-1) … 2.145 … …
(% of GDP) (2.244)**
Botswana-Health expenditure (-1) … … 7.817 …
(% of GDP) (3.086)***
Korea-Health expenditure (-1) … … -24.400 …
(% of GDP) (-1.339)
Malaysia-Health expenditure (-1) … … 2.898 …
(% of GDP) (1.072)
Mauritius-Health expenditure (-1) … … -0.477 …
(% of GDP) (-0.288)
Singapore-Health expenditure (-1) … … -1.303 …
(% of GDP) (-0.339)
Thailand-Health expenditure (-1) … … -0.938 …
(% of GDP) (-0.387)
Botswana-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 2.140
(% of GDP) (2.088)*
Korea-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … -0.428
(% of GDP) (-0.144)
Malaysia-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 2.366
(% of GDP) (1.344)
Mauritius-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 1.547
(% of GDP) (0.782)
Singapore-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 0.355
(% of GDP) (0.152)
Thailand-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … -0.634
(% of GDP) (-0.416)
No. of observations 34 34 34 34
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.576 0.532 0.349
Table 15: Results with Components of Productive Expenditures (panel OLS with 3-year averages)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. 3-year averages are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged 
one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** 
indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of 
zero coefficients.
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Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Components of 
productive 
expenditure and 
lagged growth 
rate of GDP per 
capita
Education 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Health 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Trasportation 
expenditure 
with country 
effects
Initial human capital 0.036 0.014 0.071 0.003
(2.964)*** (0.37) (2.779)** (0.106)
Tax revenue -0.028 -0.088 -0.464 -0.103
(% of GDP) (-0.192) (-0.432) (-2.469)** (-0.577)
Other revenue -0.659 -0.967 -0.617 -0.478
(% of GDP) (-6.596)*** (-5.825)*** (-5.833)*** (-4.519)***
Education expenditure (-1) 2.295 … … …
(% of GDP) (3.729)***
Health expenditure (-1) 0.537 … … …
(% of GDP) (0.832)
Transportation expenditure (-1) 0.796 … … …
(% of GDP) (1.476)
Other productive expenditure (-1) 0.159 -0.36 0.138 0.163
(% of GDP) (0.625) (-1.067) (0.553) (0.591)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) -0.195 0.581 0.468 -0.225
(% of GDP) (-0.885) (1.461) (1.585) (-1.212)
Budget surplus 0.699 0.861 0.635 0.586
(% of GDP) (6.664)*** (5.805)*** (4.85)*** (3.518)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.524) (-0.1) (-5.034)*** (-2.567)**
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.083 -0.253 0.168 -0.230
(-0.464) (-1.386) (0.983) (-1.216)
Botswana-Education expenditure (-1) … 3.451 … …
(% of GDP) (5.057)***
Korea-Education expenditure (-1) … 2.632 … …
(% of GDP) (1.862)*
Malaysia-Education expenditure (-1) … 2.814 … …
(% of GDP) (3.923)***
Mauritius-Education expenditure (-1) … 1.849 … …
(% of GDP) (2.274)**
Singapore-Education expenditure (-1) … 4.669 … …
(% of GDP) (3.252)***
Thailand-Education expenditure (-1) … 2.290 … …
(% of GDP) (3.565)***
Botswana-Health expenditure (-1) … … 7.502 …
(% of GDP) (4.514)***
Korea-Health expenditure (-1) … … -21.882 …
(% of GDP) (-2.836)**
Malaysia-Health expenditure (-1) … … 2.747 …
(% of GDP) (1.984)*
Mauritius-Health expenditure (-1) … … -0.507 …
(% of GDP) (-0.612)
Singapore-Health expenditure (-1) … … -0.816 …
(% of GDP) (-0.472)
Thailand-Health expenditure (-1) … … -0.623 …
(% of GDP) (-0.36)
Botswana-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 1.476
(% of GDP) (1.682)
Korea-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … -0.533
(% of GDP) (-0.336)
Malaysia-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 1.949
(% of GDP) (1.933)*
Mauritius-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 0.692
(% of GDP) (0.574)
Singapore-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … 0.630
(% of GDP) (0.544)
Thailand-Transportation expenditure (-1) … … … -0.883
(% of GDP) (-0.797)
No. of observations 34 34 34 34
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.665 0.708 0.549
Table 16: Results with Components of Productive Expenditures (Cross-Section SURE with 3-year 
averages)
Note: The estimation method is the cross‐section seeminly unrelated regression. 3-year averages are used. (-1) indicates variables 
lagged one period. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** 
indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of 
zero coefficients.  
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APPENDIX I – INFORMATION ON DATA 
 
COUNTRIES INCLUDED 
 
Botswana, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, Thailand 
 
YEARS INCLUDED BY COUNTRIES 
 
The years included are according to the data availability of government budget items. 
 
Botswana: 1970-96 and 2001-2005 
Indonesia: 1972-1999 and 2001-2005 
Korea: 1970-97 and 2001-2005 
Malaysia: 1972-87 and 2001-2005 
Mauritius: 1973-2005 
Singapore: 1972-2005 
Thailand: 1972-2001 
 
LIST OF VARIABLES 
 
1. Control Variables 
 
Private Investment: Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector includes land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, 
offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.  
Source: WDI and IFC working paper. 
 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP): Imports of goods and services represent the 
value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. They 
include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license 
fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, 
business, personal, and government services. They exclude labor and property income 
(formerly called factor services) as well as transfer payments. 
Source: WDI. 
 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP): Exports of goods and services represent the 
value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They 
include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license 
fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, 
business, personal, and government services. They exclude labor and property income 
(formerly called factor services) as well as transfer payments. 
Source: WDI. 
 
Openness (% of GDP): Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) plus imports of 
goods and services (% of GDP). 
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Labor force (total): Total labor force comprises people who meet the International 
Labour Organization definition of the economically active population: all people who 
supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It 
includes both the employed and the unemployed. While national practices vary in the 
treatment of such groups as the armed forces and seasonal or part-time workers, in 
general the labor force includes the armed forces, the unemployed, and first-time job-
seekers, but excludes homemakers and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the 
informal sector. 
Source: WDI. 
 
Bureaucracy Index: Indexed series between 1 and 4 measuring the quality of 
bureaucracy. Higher numbers indicate higher quality.  
Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
 
2. Initial Condition Variables 
 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollar: GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars. 
Source: WDI. 
 
Initial Human Index: Following Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007), we construct the 
initial human capital variable as the weighted sum of the initial enrolment ratios (%) in 
primary and secondary schools and in higher education. The weights are 1 for primary 
school enrolment ratio, 2 for secondary school and 3 for enrolment in higher education. 
The weights are approximations to the relative values of three types of education. The 
initial year is 1970. 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1999). 
 
Initial life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the 
same throughout its life. The initial year is 1970. 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1999). 
 
3. Government Budget Items 
 
Tax Revenue: Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for 
public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social 
security contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax 
revenue are treated as negative revenue. For central government. 
Source: GFS. 
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Total Government Revenue: Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, 
and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales. Grants are 
also excluded here. For central government. 
Source: GFS. 
 
Other Revenue: Total government revenue minus tax revenues. For central government. 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Total Government expenditure: Total central government expenditure: economic plus 
social, plus general public services, plus defense, plus other expenditure. 
Source: GFS. 
 
Budget balance: Before 2001, it is calculated as total government revenue plus grants 
minus total expenditure minus net lending. After 2001, it is total revenue plus grants 
minus total expenditure. For central government. 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Productive expenditure:  
General public services expenditure 
Defense expenditure 
Educational expenditure 
Health expenditure 
Housing expenditure 
Transportation and communication expenditure 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Unproductive expenditure: 
Social security and welfare expenditure 
Expenditure on recreation 
Expenditure on fuel and energy 
Expenditure on agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 
Expenditure on mining, mineral resources, manufacturing, and construction 
Expenditure on other economic affairs and services 
Source: Calculated by author. 
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Economic Expenditure:  
Fuel and energy expenditure 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting  
Mining and mineral resources, manufacturing and construction 
Transportation and communication 
Other economic affairs and services. 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Social Expenditure:  
Education 
Heath 
Social Security and welfare 
Housing and community amenities 
Recreational, cultural and religious affairs. 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
4. Interactive variables 
 
Interactive dummy variables with productive expenditure: For example, in 
Botswana, 
 
 
 
 
 
1*productive expenditure if the country is Botswana  
 
0 otherwise. 
Interactive dummy for productive 
expenditure in Botswana = 
Interactive dummy variables with economic expenditure: For example, in Botswana, 
 
 
 
 
1*economic expenditure if the country is Botswana  
 
0 otherwise. 
Interactive dummy for economic 
expenditure in Botswana = 
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Interactive dummy variables for education expenditure: For example, in Botswana, 
 
 
 
 
1*economic expenditure if the country is Botswana  
 
0 otherwise. 
Interactive dummy for economic 
expenditure in Botswana = 
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APPENDIX II – ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
 
 
1. Panel data least squares (OLS) 
 
This methodology is a basic panel data (cross section and time series) regression. 87 The 
general form of a model that can be estimated using a panel regression may be written as:  
 
, 
 
where is the dependent variable, and Xit is a -vector of independent variables, and 
are the error terms for  cross-sectional units observed for dated periods Ki ,...2,1=
. The parameter stands for the overall constant term in the model, while 
the and represent cross-section (fixed effects) or period specific effects. For 
identification, the coefficients have restrictions placed upon them. They can be divided 
into sets of common (across cross-section units and time periods), cross-section specific, 
and period specific regressor parameters.  
In the paper, we have introduced fixed effects if initial variables i.e. initial life 
expectancy, initial human capital or initial GDP per capita are not included. To calculate 
country specific values of some β parameters, especially for economic and social 
expenditure, and productive and unproductive expenditure, we have used country 
dummies such that 1 is used for a specific country, 0 otherwise. 
The data set can be in principle unbalanced or balanced. In this paper, our data set is 
unbalanced meaning that the time series dimension may change from country to country. 
We show the panel data as a set of cross-section specific regressions so that we have K 
cross-sectional equations each with observations stacked on top of one another:  
 
 
 
                                                 
87 The User Guide for E-views software program version 6 was used to prepare these sections.  
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for , where Ki ,...2,1= is a -element unit vector, is the -element identity matrix, 
and is a vector containing all of the period effects .  
In a similar way, we may write the specification as a set of period specific equations, 
each with K observations stacked on top of one another.  
 
tKtKittKt lIXIY ∈+⋅++⋅+⋅= γδβα '  
 
for , where lK is a K-element unit vector, IKis the K-element identity matrix, 
and is a vector containing all of the cross-section effects, ),...,,(' 11 Kδδδδ = .  
The stacked representation of the equation given above helps us understand the 
methodology better. There are two possibilities: cross-section representation or time-
series representation. First, for the specification organized as a set of cross-section 
equations, we have:  
 
∈+⊗+⊗+⋅+⋅= γδβα )()( TKTKKT IllIXIY  
 
where the matrices and are constructed to impose any restrictions on the data and 
parameters between cross-sectional units and time periods, and where the general form of 
the unconditional error covariance matrix is given by:  
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When the specification is treated as a set of time-period specific equations, the stacked 
representation by period is given by,  
 
∈+⊗+⊗+⋅+⋅= γδβα )()( TKTKKT lIIlXlY  
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with error covariance of,  
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Significance level of coefficients 
 
In the tables, the statistical significance levels of coefficients are reported. They are 1 
minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient. Assume that b 
is one of the estimated coefficients and the null and alternative hypothesis are defined as 
follow: 
 
H0: b = 0 
H1: b ≠ 0 
 
In this case, the significance level of 1% indicates that we reject H0 with at least 99% 
probability; the significance level of 5% indicates that we reject H0 with at least 95% and 
at most 99% probability; the significance level of 10% indicates that we reject H0 with at 
least 90% and at most 95% probability.  
 
2. Cross- Section Seemingly Unrelated Regression  
(Generalized Least Squares, GLS) 
GLS specifications can be estimated in a way that they account for various patterns of 
correlation between the residuals. There are four basic variance structures: cross-section 
specific heteroskedasticity, period specific heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous 
covariances, and between period covariances. The one used in this paper is cross-section 
specific heteroskedasticity (SURE). This methodology is used to check whether our 
results with ordinary least square change when we introduced cross-section specific 
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heteroskedasticity, given that in the data set we included countries quite different from 
each other. 
The SURE covariance structures allow for conditional correlation between the 
contemporaneous residuals for cross-section and , but restrict residuals in different 
periods to be uncorrelated. More specifically, it is assumed that:  
 
 
 
for all , , and with . It should be noted that the contemporaneous covariances 
do not vary over .  
When we use the time period specific residual vectors, we can specify the assumption 
above as,  
 
 
 
for all , where,  
 
 
 
This variance is named as Cross-section SURE specification since it involves covariances 
across cross-sections as in a seemingly unrelated regressions type framework. Here each 
equation corresponds to a cross-section.  
 
Cross-section SURE weighted general least squares on this specification, which are also 
referred as Parks estimator, is the feasible GLS estimator for systems where the 
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innovations are both cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated. 
While constructing , residuals from first stage estimates are used. In the second stage, 
feasible GLS is performed.  
This method can be used for a small number of cross-sections and a large number of time 
periods. Thus, for example, if you have a cross-section SURE specification with a large 
number of cross-sections and a small number of time periods, it is most likely that the 
estimated innovation correlation matrix will be nonsingular which suggests that feasible 
GLS methodology cannot be used.  
 
3. Dynamic Panel Data 
Since the lagged value of the growth rate of GDP per capita, which is the lagged value of 
dependent variable has been introduced as a regressor in our regressions, we also run our 
model with dynamic panel methodology, which is introduced by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). It is also named dynamic general method of moments (GMM). More specifically, 
we used two-step GMM methodology, taking first differences of the variables. Since a set 
of instrumental variables is used with this technique, it also helps us control for possible 
endogenity among regressors.  
The methodology can be represented with the following linear dynamic panel data 
specification88:  
 
 
 
where Y is the dependent variable and X is the set of regressors or independent variables. 
First-differencing the equation above eliminates the individual effects and produces an 
equation of the form:  
 
 
 
                                                 
88 While preparing this section, we benefited from the User Guide for E-views software program version 6.  
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which may be estimated using GMM techniques.  
The efficient GMM estimation of the equation require a different number of instruments 
for each period, with the period-specific instruments corresponding to the different 
numbers of lagged dependent and predetermined variables available at a given time 
period. Thus, in addition to any strictly exogenous variables, one can also use period-
specific sets of instruments corresponding to lagged values of the dependent and other 
predetermined variables. In the regression results given in the paper, the set of 
instruments are defined as lagged values of dependent and independent variables. The 
complete set of instrumental variables in our case is  
• the second and third lags of the growth rate of GDP per capita, initial human 
capital (or initial life expectancy or initial GDP per capita),  
• the first, second and third lags of private investment as a % of GDP,  
• the second and third lags of tax revenue, productive expenditure (or economic 
expenditure), unproductive expenditure (or social expenditure),  
• the first, second and third lags of other revenue and budget balance, all as a share 
of GDP. 
As it can be seen in the list, the lagged values of the dependent variable are also included 
as instruments. The motivation behind the use of the lagged values of the dependent 
variable as instruments can be explained as follows. If the innovations in the original 
equation are i.i.d., then in , which is the first period available for analysis of the 
specification, it is clear that is a valid instrument since it is correlated with , but 
uncorrelated with innovation . Similarly, in , which is the second available for 
the analysis, both and are potential instruments. Continuing in this way, we can 
form a set of predetermined instruments for individual using lags of the dependent 
variable,  iZ
 
 
In a similar way, instruments can be formed for each predetermined variable or regressor.  
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If we assume that the residuals, , are not autocorrelated, the optimal GMM weighting 
matrix for the first-differenced specification is given by,  
 
 
 
where M is number of cross-sections and is the matrix,  
 
 
 
and where contains a set of instruments, which is lagged values of dependent and 
independent variables in our specification. σ2 is the standard error of regression. It should 
be noted that this weighting matrix is the one used in the one-step Arellano-Bond 
estimator.  
It changes slightly for a two-step estimator, which is the one used in the paper. After 
calculating the estimates of the residuals from the one-step estimator, we can replace the 
weighting matrix with the one estimated using a form similar to White period 
covariance estimation:  
 
 
 
This weighting matrix is used in the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator.  
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